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Date:      Mon, 31 Jul 2023 20:51:14 GMT
From:      Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
To:        ports-committers@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-ports-all@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-ports-main@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   git: 5cb624204c36 - main - security/openssl31: Security update for CVE-2023-3817 (Low)
Message-ID:  <202307312051.36VKpED3005876@gitrepo.freebsd.org>

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The branch main has been updated by brnrd:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/ports/commit/?id=5cb624204c36be8911c7fd5eca62a6bff17df155

commit 5cb624204c36be8911c7fd5eca62a6bff17df155
Author:     Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2023-07-31 20:50:33 +0000
Commit:     Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2023-07-31 20:50:33 +0000

    security/openssl31: Security update for CVE-2023-3817 (Low)
    
    Security:       bad6588e-2fe0-11ee-a0d1-84a93843eb75
---
 security/openssl31/Makefile                  |  2 +-
 security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/openssl31/Makefile b/security/openssl31/Makefile
index 29221630a1e3..0625a0573716 100644
--- a/security/openssl31/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl31/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 PORTNAME=	openssl
 PORTVERSION=	3.1.1
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTREVISION=	2
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 MASTER_SITES=	https://www.openssl.org/source/ \
 		ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/
diff --git a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cbb1a7ae0128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 6a1eb62c29db6cb5eec707f9338aee00f44e26f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:22:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
+ obviously invalid
+
+If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
+is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
+
+We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
+q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
+q value.
+
+Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
+such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
+computations.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-3817
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1c16253f3c3a8d1e25918c3f404aae6a5b0893de)
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index aef6f9b1b77d..fbe279756954 100644
+--- crypto/dh/dh_check.c.orig
++++ crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
+ #else
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+     int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)



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