Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2000 14:00:26 +0200 From: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> Cc: current@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Message-ID: <200007221200.OAA06345@grimreaper.grondar.za> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007220220420.10998-100000@freefall.freebsd.org> ; from Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> "Sat, 22 Jul 2000 02:21:15 MST." References: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007220220420.10998-100000@freefall.freebsd.org>
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> On Sat, 22 Jul 2000, Mark Murray wrote: > > > Because of Yarrow's cryptographic protection of its internal state, its > > frequent reseeds and its clever geneation mechanism, this paradigm is > > less important - the output is 256-bit safe (Blowfish safe) for any size > > of output[*]. When you read 1000 bits, I am not selling you 1000 bits > > each guaranteed random, I am selling you 1000 bits that are predictable > > within the constraints of needing to crack 256-bit Blowfish. > > So what it if I want/need 257 bits? :-) Read them. You'll get them. If you want higher quality randomness than Yarrow gives, read more than once. Do other stuff; play. Don't get stuck in the "I have exhausted the randomness pool" loop; Yarrow does not play that game. From the Yarrow paper: ``Yarrow's outputs are cryptographically derived. Systems that use Yarrow's outputs are no more secure than the generation mechanism used.'' We currently have Yarrow-256(Blowfish); wanna make it Yarrow-1024? I could make it so. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
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