From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Sat Sep 15 08:20:23 2012 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BCA0106564A for ; Sat, 15 Sep 2012 08:20:23 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from markm@FreeBSD.org) Received: from gromit.grondar.org (grandfather.grondar.org [93.89.92.32]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D25348FC08 for ; Sat, 15 Sep 2012 08:20:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from uucp by gromit.grondar.org with local-rmail (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1TCnWu-0005qs-5o for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Sat, 15 Sep 2012 09:15:08 +0100 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=groundzero.grondar.org) by groundzero.grondar.org with esmtp (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1TCnVd-000Ctz-BF; Sat, 15 Sep 2012 09:13:49 +0100 To: RW In-reply-to: <20120915025820.73e04565@gumby.homeunix.com> References: <50453686.9090100@FreeBSD.org> <20120911082309.GD72584@dragon.NUXI.org> <504F0687.7020309@FreeBSD.org> <201209121628.18088.jhb@freebsd.org> <5050F477.8060409@FreeBSD.org> <20120912213141.GI14077@x96.org> <20120913052431.GA15052@dragon.NUXI.org> <20120915025820.73e04565@gumby.homeunix.com> From: Mark Murray Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2012 09:13:49 +0100 Message-Id: Cc: Arthur Mesh , Ian Lepore , Doug Barton , Ben Laurie , freebsd-security@freebsd.org, "Bjoern A. Zeeb" Subject: Re: svn commit: r239569 - head/etc/rc.d X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2012 08:20:23 -0000 RW writes: > So far no one has come up with a single cogent argument for > compression. If you replace compression with hashing then the need > modifying the kernel code is eliminated. Compression reduces file size without losing entropy; in fact it serves as an entropy concentrator. That said, I agree that its output is still not small enough and its speed is unacceptable. As for modifying kernel code, $ cat /dev/zero > /dev/random ... can swamp entropy harvesting. Its an obvious attack and easily spotted/thwarted, but I'd like to defend against it; the current code is a bit too naive. M -- Mark R V Murray Cert APS(Open) Dip Phys(Open) BSc Open(Open) BSc(Hons)(Open) Pi: 132511160