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Date:      Tue, 19 Sep 2000 22:27:16 +0000 (GMT)
From:      Terry Lambert <tlambert@primenet.com>
To:        jcm@freebsd-uk.eu.org (j mckitrick)
Cc:        tlambert@primenet.com (Terry Lambert), brett@lariat.org (Brett Glass), chat@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Learn from History, please (was Re: new license idea?)
Message-ID:  <200009192227.PAA14621@usr02.primenet.com>
In-Reply-To: <20000919195026.A72836@dogma.freebsd-uk.eu.org> from "j mckitrick" at Sep 19, 2000 07:50:26 PM

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> A few questions (you knew they were coming  ;-)
> 
> 1.  If a company has no real competitors for a product, how can they be
> marginalized?  Suppose a BSD licensed digital paint program
> appeared, and a company used the code and extended it to a proprietary version
> especially suited to photograph processing.  Suppose they kept the changes to
> the code, and no competitors appeared.  How would they become marginalized?
> Simply because of the maintenance pressures of continuing to merge current
> changes from the open source branch with their own?

By virtue of people who want the features of the proprietary
product deciding to add them to the open source version, one
at a time, rather than paying for it.

Consider that other people will be adding other code to the
open source version, which people may demand in the proprietary
version as well -- and not understand why the features are slow
in coming.

From another tack, we might consider that someone who needs an
image processing program might not need the full capabilities
of the commercial version, but have bought it for support or
other reasons (yes, I have been known to buy software).  For
example, I know someone who recently bought "Stronghold"; the
reasons for the capital outlay for it were (1) making Apache
work with OpenSSL and RSAREF was not worth the time it would
cost to learn about it, and (2) to get a certificate.  It's
pretty obvious that a certificate could have been had at a
fraction of the cost, without the server cost included.

Going back to our image processing software user, we look at
features coming out in the open source version that are enticing
to the user, who does some photographic processing, but uses
the program more than half the time just as generic image
processing software (the same way I use the copy of Adobe
Photodeluxe 4.0 Home Edition that came with my Sony laptop).

As time goes on, the vendor will find themselves with only
their core of power users who don't need to do things outside
the boundaries of the limitations inherent in the product;
or in other words, they will find themselves marginalized into
a niche market that will, if they are not careful to follow
the open source developements, turn into a legacy market.


> 2.  Using the illustration of the two firewall companies, how
> could Company B remain profitable after opening its source?

This is a two-parter, so I will answer in two parts.

The trite answer to the first part is "By not opening _all_
of its source".  This really means letting go of the tactical
in order to concentrate on the strategic; this is hopefully
(from the point of view of the V.C. funding or the shareholders)
a core competency that they bring to the table.  An example from
recent BSD history is Soft Updates.  Whistle paid Kirk (and
Julian and, much less, me) for the time to develope the code for
FreeBSD, in order to get around the need for a UPS in the
InterJet.  Kirk was bound to keep the code from being commercially
utilized by direct competitors for the time that Whistle thought
it would take to recoup R&D costs.  After that, the code quit
being strategic, and became tactical.  We could add in a
marketing dimension as well: if a competitor started using the
code after it became tactical, then we could point to our lead
on the technically as a marketing strategy.  So in that sense,
releasing the tactical code could actually have more strategic
value, whereas keeping it under wraps would have zero additional
strategic value.


> Does the concept of strategic victory include getting your
> foot in the door (or your code in the tree) at the expense of
> short-term profits?

This is a hard one to answer.  On the one hand, you have all
of these "Internet Companies" or "dot coms" who are burning
huge amounts of cash to acquire customers, and damn the
consequences.  One of the consequences for most of them is
a separate "burn rate" from the normally considered one of
cash: I call it "customer burn rate".  What it amounts to
is whether you in fact achieve anything lasting in terms of
a customer relationship.  For most of the "dot coms" that
are failing in recent history, I think the answer is "no".

So if "getting your foot in the door" is your goal, then you
are probably doomed, no matter what your approach.  I really
like to use a different analogy: "getting the camel's nose
into the tent".  The point is to try to _maintain_ the
relationship, long term, in a sustainable way.

I think that long term, "portal plays" are pretty much doomed.
Look at Yahoo jilting Inktomi for their new search engine
technology: things in the Internet space are fickle.  There is
really no such ting as traditional "brand loyalty" or "frequency
marketing", although some people are trying real hard to find
ways to address this.  The best bet so far seems to be the
"sticky application"; the theory is that you get a webmail or
other application account, and then you come back.  But when
you come back, you are returning for the freebie, so it's still
a game of selling your eyeballs to advertisers.  I think that
most ASPs are going to flounder and crash, if they attempt a
different model that doesn't take what;s out there for free
into account, and deal with it somehow.

So after all that, "yes, if you can get the camel's nose in
the tent, it is worth the short term profit to ensure the
ongoing long term revenue stream".  But doing that is a trick
with a hole in it -- that is, it is not something that you can
put into a formula, turn a crank, and have a succeful Internet
based business (or even a successful "brick and morter" based
business) pop out, like Athena from Zeus' head.


> 3.  Do any of these arguments apply differently to separate
> apps than to operating systems?

Less so.  I recently spent several months integrating 30 or so
open source packages into a single entity.  I ended up with
about 3.1 million lines of code that would compile on FreeBSD
or AIX with the same set of Makefiles, and could target a
distribution/installation directory seperate from where these
things normally wanted to install (and clobber system parts,
each other, and, in general, make a mess of trying to install
security patches that applied to the components being replaced,
etc.).

I'm very good at this type of work, if I do say so myself, as
I am very detail orients: everything must function exactly
right, or I'm not happy with it.  Most kernel hackers of any
ability would probably be damn good at it too, if they could
find the patience.

That said, I did a smaller, but similar, project in less time
(2 months) and with a team of myself and several part-time
people who mostly worked on other tasks.  It was only about
1.8 million lines of code.  IBM Global Services (IGS) were
willing to so the same work, but with two architects, a team
of almost a dozen total people, and estimated 8 months.  As I
said, I'm good at this type of work, even if it is mostly sanding
and glueing.

The point to this is not self aggrandizement, but pointing out
the flaw in approaching applications the same way.

Geoffrey Moore (of Regis McKenna fame) likes to proselytize
about "whole product" strategies.  If you were selling an
application based on open source, there is a huge amount of
work you would need to engage in before you had a whole
product (or, as in the case of my code, a whole service).


> 4.  I am a bit unclear on this paragraph:
> 
> | So the claims of fragmentation risk are really exagerated; they are,
> | in fact, FUD.  One does not need a license to protect one from a
> | fragmentation or a code hijack, unless the code is strategic, in
> | which case, one is better off not revealing it at all, since it is
> | easy to read with one hand and type with the other; not only easy,
> | but the economic pressures in Silicon Valley have raised it to a
> | fine art, to the point of having its own name: "clean rooming".
> 
> Do you mean that a really good 'secret' or innovation is best
> protected by not releasing it at all, at least for a time?

Yes.  This is why I think the best method of "promoting progress
in the arts and sciences", at least as regards computer science,
is to get rid of patent and copyright protection on software, and
replace it with a much shorter duration protection, similar to
patents, but requiring source escrow, and precluding litigation
following the escrow period (after which it would become public
domain).  I wouldn't make it last over 7 years, under any
circumstances, and would prefer 2 years as a default, unless
the applicant could show a longer R&D period (after which, it
would be limited to the documented R&D period or 7 years, whichever
is less).


> Or is there an additional meaning?

No.

> And what is "clean rooming"?

1)	Bob tests the code to determine its behaviour
2)	Bob documents the behaviour (entry points, etc.)
3)	Bob is paid, and never hear from again
4)	Tom takes a test to ensure he has never seen the
	code or worked with it (this is called a "virginity test")
5)	Tom build code that does the same thing, using Bob's
	documentation
6)	The code is released, and competes with the original
	code that Bob documented

This is how Compaq was able to claim 100% compatability, after
"clean rooming" the IBM PC BIOS for their clone machines; as
an example, Compaq considered this code strategic, because of
the high barrier to entry for competitors, and their ability
to undercut IBM's prices.  Then companies like Phoenix got
into the business, and now a BIOS is a commodity (tactical:
you buy it from the lowest bidder who can meet your software
requirements).


					Terry Lambert
					terry@lambert.org
---
Any opinions in this posting are my own and not those of my present
or previous employers.


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