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Date:      Thu, 19 Sep 1996 22:38:26 -0500
From:      Joe Greco <jgreco@brasil.moneng.mei.com>
To:        hackers@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: Panix, TCP, and RED
Message-ID:  <199609200338.WAA11828@brasil.moneng.mei.com>
In-Reply-To: <vxjohj6qzha.fsf@virtual1.eecs.harvard.edu>

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Are any networking folks looking into doing something like this for
FreeBSD?

In comp.protocols.tcp-ip article <vxjohj6qzha.fsf@virtual1.eecs.harvard.edu>, Robert Morris wrote:
:Queues managed by random drop provide reasonably fair service without
:knowing the identities of the senders.
:
:The idea is to drop a randomly selected listen queue entry upon
:overflow, rather than the most recently arrived SYN. This penalizes
:senders in proportion to the number of SYNs they have queued. If I
:send just one SYN, chances are that it will be accepted even if the
:queue is full, at somebody else's expense. If the evil hacker has many
:SYNs queued, chances are it will be at his expense. Nothing here
:depends on the evil hacker using the same IP source address for all
:his SYNs.
:
:Can the evil hacker still win by sending SYNs faster? Suppose that the
:listen queue is 100 entries long, that TCP keeps half-open connections
:for 75 seconds, and that the server CPU is not overloaded. With the
:current TCP implementation, the evil hacker need only send a few SYNs
:per second to deny service to the good guys. With random drop, a good
:guy's SYN will be placed in the listen queue, and his connection will
:be accept()ed if he gets an ACK back before the evil hacker dislodges
:him. Imagine that his ACK arrives 100 milliseconds later, so the evil
:hacker must dislodge the SYN in just 100ms.  If the evil hacker sends
:500 SYNs per second, he has less than a 50% chance of dislodging the
:good guy's SYN. Perhaps 500/second is fast enough that he'd easily be
:caught.
:
:Consider reading Mankin and Ramakrishnan's RFC 1254, whence these
:ideas came.





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