From owner-freebsd-current Sat Jul 22 12:40:22 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from grimreaper.grondar.za (grimreaper.grondar.za [196.7.18.138]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C8AE537B8BF for ; Sat, 22 Jul 2000 12:40:16 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from mark@grondar.za) Received: from grimreaper.grondar.za (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by grimreaper.grondar.za (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA37028; Sat, 22 Jul 2000 21:39:57 +0200 (SAST) (envelope-from mark@grimreaper.grondar.za) Message-Id: <200007221939.VAA37028@grimreaper.grondar.za> To: "David Schwartz" Cc: current@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak References: In-Reply-To: ; from "David Schwartz" "Sat, 22 Jul 2000 12:01:44 MST." Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2000 21:39:56 +0200 From: Mark Murray Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG > /dev/random should block if the system does not contain as much real entropy > as the reader desires. Otherwise, the PRNG implementation will be the > weakest link for people who have deliberately selected higher levels of > protection from cryptographic attack. I don't want to rehash this thread from the beginning. Please go back, read the Yarrow paper, and recognise that Yarrow is not an entropy-counter, it is a cryptographically secure PRNG. The "count random bits and block" model does not apply. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message