From owner-freebsd-current Sat Jul 22 15:19:34 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.FreeBSD.ORG [204.216.27.21]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EA7637BAEE; Sat, 22 Jul 2000 15:19:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kris@FreeBSD.org) Received: from localhost (kris@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.9.3/8.9.2) with ESMTP id PAA29493; Sat, 22 Jul 2000 15:19:29 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from kris@FreeBSD.org) X-Authentication-Warning: freefall.freebsd.org: kris owned process doing -bs Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2000 15:19:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Kris Kennaway To: "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" Cc: Mark Murray , current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak In-Reply-To: <3979BE5F.9FADF58A@vangelderen.org> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG On Sat, 22 Jul 2000, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: > You don't care in practice, 256 bits are unguessable. Actually, I do..that's the entire point of using long keys. > If you do care, you load a different random module :-) The core of my complaint is that even though our old PRNG did crappy entropy handling, we used to have such a method, which is now gone. I'd like to see yarrow hang off /dev/urandom and have /dev/random tap directly into the entropy pool (perhaps a third pool separate from Yarrow's fast/slow) so I can generate my large keys safely. Kris -- In God we Trust -- all others must submit an X.509 certificate. -- Charles Forsythe To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message