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Date:      Wed, 1 Feb 2006 22:55:40 +0000 (GMT)
From:      Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>
To:        Julian Elischer <julian@elischer.org>
Cc:        trustedbsd-audit@TrustedBSD.org, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?K=F6vesd=E1n_G=E1bor?= <gabor.kovesdan@t-hosting.hu>, current@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: HEADS UP: Audit integration into CVS in progress,	some tree disruption
Message-ID:  <20060201224413.W90364@fledge.watson.org>
In-Reply-To: <43E136F9.6080306@elischer.org>
References:  <20060201221213.L87763@fledge.watson.org> <43E134AB.8000600@t-hosting.hu> <43E136F9.6080306@elischer.org>

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On Wed, 1 Feb 2006, Julian Elischer wrote:

>>> I'll send out follow-up e-mail once the worst is past, along with 
>>> information on what it all means, and how to try it out (for those not 
>>> already on trustedbsd-audit, who have been hearing about this for a 
>>> while).
>>> 
>> Do you plan to merge it to RELENG_6? If so, when? Maybe for the upcoming 
>> 6.1? Or only for 6.2 or later?
>
> is there a website about all this stuff?  "What's it for?"

I'm sure I promised to answer exactly that question in my followup e-mail once 
the integration is done. :-)

The quick answer is that this is an implementation of security event auditing, 
as required by the Orange Book C2 and later Common Criteria CAPP security 
evaluation/standard.  These documents provide specifications for a set of 
functional requirements (and assurance requirements) regarding the behavior of 
operating systems with respect to security.  One of the requirements is the 
fine-grained and configurable logging of security-relevant events. 
Security-relevant turns out to be pretty all-inclusive, as CAPP requires the 
ability to log the results of access control decisions associated with 
discretionary access control, which means basically all file I/O, including 
path lookups.  So what is present in our implementation is:

- The introduction of a centralized kernel audit event engine,
   src/sys/security/audit, which includes various system calls, an event queue,
   kernel worker thread to process the queue, interfaces to capture system call
   information, a system call for user applications to submit audit records,
   pre-selection mechanism, etc.

- OpenBSM, an implementation of the Solaris/OpenSolaris Basic Security Module
   API and file format for audit trails.  This is derived from the BSM audit
   support found in the Apple Mac OS X and Darwin operating systems, although
   substantially reworked, cleaned up, and synchronized to recent BSM changes
   in Solaris, such as 64-bit records.

- auditd, a daemon for managing audit event logs and the audit subsystem.

- Modifications throughout the kernel and in many places in user space to
   generate audit records.

Unlike existing logging and tracing mechanisms, audit has to meet a number of 
reliability, security, and functional requirements that basically drove the 
implementation of a new logging system rather than adaptation of an existing 
one:

- Only authorized processes can read and write to the audit log.

- Detailed subject and object information, including file paths, full
   credential information for processes, etc.

- Configurable log granularity by user, subsystem, operation, including the
   ability to control the logging of non-attributable events.

- Audit log reduction tools and pre-selection mechanism.

- Reliability requirements relating to maximum record loss in the event of
   power loss, configurable ability to fail-stop the system when the audit
   store is filled.

- Portable log format based on the de facto industry standard BSM format (used
   by Solaris, Mac OS X, and a moderate number of intrusion detection tools,
   post-mortem tools, etc).

The implementation is not yet fully complete, but it's now at the point where 
more broad exposure and testing would be very helpful. The hope is to have 
much of the current implementation merged in the next couple of days, and the 
remainder over the next couple of weeks.

Since I did the intro for this, I should take this opportunity to thank Apple 
Computer for sponsoring the original development work as part of their Common 
Criteria CAPP evaluation for Mac OS X, and then releasing the results under a 
BSD license (announcement on this to follow), SPARTA for releasing extensions 
and additional work on the system, not to mention the team of people who have 
been involved in porting over, adapting, and substantially enhancing the 
Darwin audit support, including Wayne Salamon (part of the original audit 
development team), who has done extensive development work on it, and Tom 
Rhodes, who has written a lot of the new documentation including a new 
handbook chapter on configuring audit support.

Robert N M Watson



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