Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2001 19:13:43 +0200 From: Szilveszter Adam <sziszi@petra.hos.u-szeged.hu> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Fwd: Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Message-ID: <20010615191343.B545@petra.hos.u-szeged.hu>
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Hello,
I do not think this should go without some investigation. The fact that the
exploit code does not work as posted proves nothing.
I am confident however that the Security Officer Team is already doing its
job.
----- Forwarded message from Jason R Thorpe <thorpej@zembu.com> -----
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2001 23:38:03 -0700
From: Jason R Thorpe <thorpej@zembu.com>
To: Przemyslaw Frasunek <venglin@freebsd.lublin.pl>
Cc: Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>,
Bugtraq <BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
Subject: Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise
Organization: Zembu Labs, Inc.
On Thu, Jun 14, 2001 at 07:09:31PM +0200, Przemyslaw Frasunek wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 14, 2001 at 05:14:46PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> > OpenBSD 2.9,2.8
> > Have not tested on other OSes but they may be vulnerable
>
> FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE isn't vulnerable. Looks like it's dropping set[ug]id
> privileges before allowing detach.
Uh, the fundamental problem is that there's a chance to PT_ATTACH to
such a process before the P_SUGID bit is set in the proc. This can
happen when, e.g. the ucred structure is copied (there is a potentially
blocking malloc() call in that path).
A cursory glance shows several places where the FreeBSD kernel has
code like:
/* sanity check */
/* blocking call */
/* change user/group ID */
/* set P_SUGID */
During the /* blocking call */, another process can sneak in and PT_ATTACH
the process that is about to become sugid.
--
-- Jason R. Thorpe <thorpej@zembu.com>
----- End forwarded message -----
--
Regards:
Szilveszter ADAM
Szeged University
Szeged Hungary
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