Date: Fri, 28 Dec 2012 10:06:19 -0800 From: Kevin Oberman <kob6558@gmail.com> To: Matthew Seaman <matthew@freebsd.org> Cc: stable@freebsd.org, Garrett Wollman <wollman@hergotha.csail.mit.edu>, rainer@ultra-secure.de Subject: Re: Anothe pkgng question: signing a repository Message-ID: <CAN6yY1tZBsnPLSF1JSGjtyDhOO7gkY%2BNpZ0jNyMipGgMkotvSg@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <50DDD6C6.3050606@FreeBSD.org> References: <201212272101.qBRL1hXP016548@hergotha.csail.mit.edu> <50DDD6C6.3050606@FreeBSD.org>
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On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 9:28 AM, Matthew Seaman <matthew@freebsd.org> wrote: > On 27/12/2012 21:01, Garrett Wollman wrote: >>> I'm creating my own repository and have created a key for it. >> [...] >>> >What does pkg expect to be in this file? > >> A public key. It does not use X.509 (nor is there any reason why it >> should, although I suppose it could be made to at the cost of >> significant added complexity and a bootstrapping problem). > > pkgng has a quite minimal signing setup -- it uses naked RSA > public/private keys without committing to either of the two popular > models for providing assurance on the validity of public keys (viz: PGP > web of trust or X509 style certificate chains to some trusted root > certificate). It's not clear at the moment if one or other or neither > of those styles would be preferred in the future. > > Or it may well be the case that RFC6698 (DANE -- DNS-Based > Authentication of Named Entities) via DNSSEC signed zone data[*] is > preferred over either of the two means frequently used at the moment. > Remember that there's really only one cryptographic signature needed for > each architecture/OS version specific repository catalogue. So not a > huge maintenance burden keeping the DNS up to date and signed even if a > new repository catalogue is published each day. > > Cheers, > > Matthew > > [*] FreeBSD.org is not currently DNSSEC signed, so use of DANE will have > to remain no more than a pipe-dream for the time being. So why not? BIND 9.9 makes signing pretty easy and many registrars support it, though not all do. I think Tucows does, though I don't use them, so I might be wrong. With all of the concern over security after the intrusion, this seems like a good time to get started with signing. (Yes, I know everyone is really tied up with auditing things, but if it keeps getting delayed, ti will not happen.) And, yes, DANE is clearly preferable to either PGP (#2 choice, IMHO) or X.509 (too broken to be worth considering). -- R. Kevin Oberman, Network Engineer E-mail: kob6558@gmail.com
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