Date: Mon, 26 Feb 1996 08:28:33 -0800 (PST) From: Tom Samplonius <tom@uniserve.com> To: Mark Smith <msmith@comtch.iea.com> Cc: invalid opcode <coredump@nervosa.com>, taob@io.org, freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Suspicious symlinks in /tmp Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.3.91.960226082441.21606A-100000@haven.uniserve.com> In-Reply-To: <199602261536.PAA11711@comtch.iea.com>
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On Mon, 26 Feb 1996, Mark Smith wrote: > > > > On Sun, 25 Feb 1996, Mark Smith wrote: > > > > > > Looks like someone is trying to exploit a race condition in order to grab > > > > the password file. > > > > > > Will this attack work under FreeBSD 2.1R ? > > > Mark > > > > A race condition attack will work under any OS when a race condition is > > possible. > > > > Possibly, I didn't make my self clear. Is this race condition possible > under FreeBSD 2.1R ? The stock password file editing utils use /etc for temp space, so symlinks in /tmp is harmless. And as some have suggested, files pointed to by symlinks in /tmp will not be deleted during clearing of /tmp at bootup. Tom
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