From owner-freebsd-geom@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Jun 14 23:33:42 2012 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-geom@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (unknown [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D71121065670 for ; Thu, 14 Jun 2012 23:33:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from rsimmons0@gmail.com) Received: from mail-vb0-f54.google.com (mail-vb0-f54.google.com [209.85.212.54]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BAD18FC0A for ; Thu, 14 Jun 2012 23:33:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: by vbmv11 with SMTP id v11so1790802vbm.13 for ; Thu, 14 Jun 2012 16:33:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=1pQ/sVA8wowM2H0AZje1UB+Gqup0D+wiUci3AFEY6C4=; b=AAXY6C0JPgDOOCCOojdxK9X0O717gnOL9c1FaTKSRGOfrtXDZBHjfzgT4jHtwsApFw hXMZAMVBz90Fm1qHyJCy4+aCRbtfSZhzjz7QZxnxKaQYApo3lTiM3OHwQuxzO5UPAUSr JzvkNeI4BURFZjATUstE8enzL8f3aJOHSHrx+i0IS9FWs1QVSb8cMA/qwfCl16sN4lyD W6/Hesgi4KjOuqVSB0oKnFrrT2KaQpNl0XCxbEgupK98Tne7ZdFkCLzm5CCyVA/8Lp7c EWaAKNF7CUNE3ht9j1m+OTr1Fna1dMldLox6drulPveA2PnnHeNZuk3egXR7nSVEdCpA TrUg== MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.52.176.232 with SMTP id cl8mr1692736vdc.115.1339716816509; Thu, 14 Jun 2012 16:33:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.52.113.97 with HTTP; Thu, 14 Jun 2012 16:33:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 19:33:36 -0400 Message-ID: From: Robert Simmons To: freebsd-geom@freebsd.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Subject: Pre-boot authentication / geli-aware bootcode X-BeenThere: freebsd-geom@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: GEOM-specific discussions and implementations List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 23:33:42 -0000 I posted this question to security, but all I got back was the sound of crickets... Would it be possible to make FreeBSD's bootcode aware of geli encrypted volumes? I would like to enter the password and begin decryption so that the kernel and /boot are inside the encrypted volume. Ideally the only unencrypted area of the disk would be the gpt protected mbr and the bootcode. I know that Truecrypt is able to do something like this with its truecrypt boot loader, is something like this possible with FreeBSD without using Truecrypt?