From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Fri May 5 09:24:34 2006 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2235916A402; Fri, 5 May 2006 09:24:34 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from BORJAMAR@SARENET.ES) Received: from smtp1.sarenet.es (smtp1.sarenet.es [194.30.0.4]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B115A43D53; Fri, 5 May 2006 09:24:33 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from BORJAMAR@SARENET.ES) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (borja.sarenet.es [192.148.167.77]) by smtp1.sarenet.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B9392C6; Fri, 5 May 2006 11:24:31 +0200 (CEST) In-Reply-To: References: <20060504172309.D17611@fledge.watson.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v749.3) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed Message-Id: <38D971A6-3942-4115-B2CE-40D6592E1F17@SARENET.ES> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Borja Marcos Date: Fri, 5 May 2006 11:24:34 +0200 To: Borja Marcos X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.749.3) Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Robert Watson Subject: Re: MAC policies and shared hosting X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 May 2006 09:24:34 -0000 > Regarding the multi-level idea, it would be a second phase. I would > like to be able to contain effectively a possible root escalation > from a poorly written CGI or PHP script. I know, it would be anyway > extremely hard. But if we could launch the web server process with > an additional lower security level inherited by all of its child > processes, we could prevent damage to the system even by a child > processes that escalated to root. And I answer myself :) (forgot to add this) Another desired functionality involves making sure that code injected into a poorly written PHP or CGI module cannot (for example) establish unauthorized network connections, listen(), etc. The FreeBSD ipfw has a lot of potential, but, unfortunately, ftp complicates the implementation of a simple uid-based limitation. Security levels would help here as well. Borja.