From owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Fri Dec 30 03:57:34 2005 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Delivered-To: freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CC5B16A41F for ; Fri, 30 Dec 2005 03:57:34 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from ache@nagual.pp.ru) Received: from nagual.pp.ru (nagual.pp.ru [194.87.13.69]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88CD343D55 for ; Fri, 30 Dec 2005 03:57:33 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from ache@nagual.pp.ru) Received: from nagual.pp.ru (ache@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nagual.pp.ru (8.13.4/8.13.4) with ESMTP id jBU3vPwJ052195; Fri, 30 Dec 2005 06:57:25 +0300 (MSK) (envelope-from ache@nagual.pp.ru) Received: (from ache@localhost) by nagual.pp.ru (8.13.4/8.13.4/Submit) id jBU3vOmf052194; Fri, 30 Dec 2005 06:57:24 +0300 (MSK) (envelope-from ache) Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 06:57:24 +0300 From: Andrey Chernov To: Matt Emmerton Message-ID: <20051230035724.GA52167@nagual.pp.ru> Mail-Followup-To: Andrey Chernov , Matt Emmerton , Martin Cracauer , Barney Wolff , freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG, Sean Bryant References: <20051229221459.A17102@cons.org> <030d01c60cf1$db80a290$1200a8c0@gsicomp.on.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <030d01c60cf1$db80a290$1200a8c0@gsicomp.on.ca> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Cc: Barney Wolff , Martin Cracauer , freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG, Sean Bryant Subject: Re: fetch extension - use local filename from content-dispositionheader X-BeenThere: freebsd-current@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions about the use of FreeBSD-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2005 03:57:34 -0000 On Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 10:33:48PM -0500, Matt Emmerton wrote: > > Forbidding "/" will set the security to the same level as the base > > functionality. I like that. > > Agreed, although it still leaves open all the security loopholes that were > mentioned, given the proper cwd and malicious intent on the server end. What about "../../../../../../../../../../../../sbin/init" ? -- http://ache.pp.ru/