From owner-freebsd-hackers Sun May 31 14:49:06 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id OAA27589 for freebsd-hackers-outgoing; Sun, 31 May 1998 14:49:06 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from monk.via.net (monk.via.net [209.81.9.10]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id OAA27580 for ; Sun, 31 May 1998 14:48:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from joe@via.net) Received: (from joe@localhost) by monk.via.net (8.6.11/8.6.12) id OAA25397 for freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG; Sun, 31 May 1998 14:48:18 -0700 Date: Sun, 31 May 1998 14:48:18 -0700 From: Joe McGuckin Message-Id: <199805312148.OAA25397@monk.via.net> To: freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Signed executables, safe delete etc. X-Sun-Charset: US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG I've thought about this in the past - specifically as it would apply to a firewall machine. If binaries could be signed with with a key, and the kernel exec routine required that a proper key be decryped before loading the program, this would eliminate someone hacking onto a firewall and using it as a platform for further mischief. Generally, they like to bring over a toolkit of snooping programs written in 'C'. Even though they could compile their nifty toolset, nothing would execute because they couldn't properly sign their binaries. Of course, the signing program would have to reside on a floppy or other removable media. I don't think it would be wise to leave it on the system. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message