From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Mar 7 16:40:27 2005 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FD7E16A4CE for ; Mon, 7 Mar 2005 16:40:27 +0000 (GMT) Received: from cydem.org (S0106000103ce4c9c.ed.shawcable.net [68.149.254.167]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C55D643D31 for ; Mon, 7 Mar 2005 16:40:26 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from soralx@cydem.org) Received: from S01060020ed3972ba.ed.shawcable.net (S01060020ed3972ba.ed.shawcable.net [68.149.254.68]) by cydem.org (Postfix/FreeBSD) with ESMTP id A78A3380B5; Mon, 7 Mar 2005 09:40:25 -0700 (MST) From: To: , Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 09:40:49 -0700 User-Agent: KMail/1.5.4 References: <200503052027.j25KRmAF055472@marlena.vvi.at> In-Reply-To: <200503052027.j25KRmAF055472@marlena.vvi.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <200503070940.49393.soralx@cydem.org> cc: aleine@austrosearch.net cc: phk@phk.freebsd.dk Subject: Re: FUD about CGD and GBDE X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2005 16:40:27 -0000 > I also believe that it would be beneficial to implement regular rewriting > of randomly picked lock sector(s) at random times during a user specified > interval (up to x rewrites within n seconds) in order to further obscure > the write pattern and provide additional protection for lock sectors. > ALeine I agree. I would also add random reads (or specially designed, combined random reads and writes) to make traffic analysis and differential attacks a real PITA for the hacker (although this idea may not be very effective against a highly motivated and determined attacker, such as some government, for instance). Every data storage device has to be "hot", initially at least. Moreover, it is much better to keep the disk attached until the last minute before the attacker will get access to it, because this offers the user protection: deleting keys from a "cold" disk is not possible. Therefore, it is important for GBDE to protect "hot" disks as much as possible (including protection methods against "cleaning lady" copy & differential attacks, for SAN environments & other traffic analysis attacks, etc). BTW, PHK, why did you choose the scheme of encrypting offsets of lock sectors with part of key material and storing them somewhere, instead of just using part of the key material itself to determine the offsets? Timestamp: 0x422BE3D9 [SorAlx] http://cydem.org.ua/ ridin' VN1500-B2