From owner-freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Mon Apr 26 20:50:36 2021 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-stable@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE0DD5F081D for ; Mon, 26 Apr 2021 20:50:36 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from mike@sentex.net) Received: from pyroxene2a.sentex.ca (pyroxene19.sentex.ca [IPv6:2607:f3e0:0:3::19]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "pyroxene.sentex.ca", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FTcVM296Dz4ZX4 for ; Mon, 26 Apr 2021 20:50:35 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from mike@sentex.net) Received: from [IPv6:2607:f3e0:0:4:715b:d722:65a1:351d] ([IPv6:2607:f3e0:0:4:715b:d722:65a1:351d]) by pyroxene2a.sentex.ca (8.16.1/8.15.2) with ESMTPS id 13QKoRqS084566 (version=TLSv1.3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128 verify=NO); Mon, 26 Apr 2021 16:50:27 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from mike@sentex.net) To: d@delphij.net, FreeBSD-STABLE Mailing List References: <56a4a35f-b4d7-661a-f59b-8cd399784e6e@delphij.net> From: mike tancsa Subject: Re: zfs native encryption best practices on RELENG13 Message-ID: <89f5a96b-60fa-2d99-3f61-42cade6280eb@sentex.net> Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 16:50:27 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56a4a35f-b4d7-661a-f59b-8cd399784e6e@delphij.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 4FTcVM296Dz4ZX4 X-Spamd-Bar: - Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org; dkim=none; dmarc=none; spf=pass (mx1.freebsd.org: domain of mike@sentex.net designates 2607:f3e0:0:3::19 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=mike@sentex.net X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-2.00 / 15.00]; RCVD_TLS_ALL(0.00)[]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; FREEFALL_USER(0.00)[mike]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; R_SPF_ALLOW(-0.20)[+ip6:2607:f3e0::/32]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROM(0.00)[]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; HFILTER_HELO_IP_A(1.00)[pyroxene2a.sentex.ca]; HFILTER_HELO_NORES_A_OR_MX(0.30)[pyroxene2a.sentex.ca]; DMARC_NA(0.00)[sentex.net]; SPAMHAUS_ZRD(0.00)[2607:f3e0:0:3::19:from:127.0.2.255]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_SOME(0.00)[]; RBL_DBL_DONT_QUERY_IPS(0.00)[2607:f3e0:0:3::19:from]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; RCPT_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-1.00)[-1.000]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-1.000]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; R_DKIM_NA(0.00)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; ASN(0.00)[asn:11647, ipnet:2607:f3e0::/32, country:CA]; RCVD_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2]; MAILMAN_DEST(0.00)[freebsd-stable] X-BeenThere: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: Production branch of FreeBSD source code List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 20:50:37 -0000 On 4/23/2021 5:23 PM, Xin Li wrote: > On 4/23/21 13:53, mike tancsa wrote: >> Starting to play around with RELENG_13 and wanted explore ZFS' built i= n >> encryption.=C2=A0 Is there a best practices doc on how to do full disk= >> encryption anywhere thats not GELI based=C2=A0 ?=C2=A0 There are lots = for=20 >> GELI, >> but nothing I could find for native OpenZFS encryption on FreeBSD >> >> i.e box gets rebooted, enter in passphrase to allow it to boot kind of= >> thing from the boot loader prompt ? > I think loader do not support the native OpenZFS encryption yet. > However, you can encrypt non-essential datasets on a boot pool (that is= , > if com.datto:encryption is "active" AND the bootfs dataset is not > encrypted, you can still boot from it). > > BTW instead of entering passphrase at loader prompt, if / is not > encrypted, it's also possible to do something like > https://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/2012-August/006547= =2Ehtml > . > > Personally I'd probably go with GELI (or other kind of full disk > encryption) regardless if OpenZFS's native encryption is used because m= y > primary goal is to be able to just throw away bad disks when they are > removed from production [1]. If the pool is not fully encrypted, there= > is always a chance that the sensitive data have landed some unencrypted= > datasets and never gets fully overwritten. > > [1] Also keep in mind: https://xkcd.com/538/ Thanks for the perspective and links.=C2=A0 I have a couple of use case scenarios.=C2=A0 One, for devices in somewhat physically untrusted environments.=C2=A0 Someone breaks into the store, and steals the PC.=C2=A0=20 I can see the advantages of GELI to this environment.=C2=A0 The other is the ability for customers to send me encrypted datasets for offsite backup.=C2= =A0 If its encrypted, I have less exposure if the dataset is encrypted and I cant see the contents.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Same for making backups to disks to pu= t in cold storage although yes, I can see GELI having an an advantage again for full disk encryption.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ---Mike