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Date:      Wed, 20 Oct 1999 09:14:13 +1000
From:      Peter Jeremy <jeremyp@gsmx07.alcatel.com.au>
To:        freebsd-arch@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: kern.securelevel and X
Message-ID:  <99Oct20.090951est.40349@border.alcanet.com.au>
In-Reply-To: <19991019105525.A82390@bitbox.follo.net>
References:  <19991017012750.A812@fever.semiotek.com> <380A1E2C.CCA326F5@gorean.org> <19991018024704.A512@semiotek.com> <xzpyad12jd7.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no> <19991018043039.B1711@semiotek.com> <xzpso392gj0.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no> <19991018142633.D1DDB1DA3@bone.nectar.com> <xzp90503esj.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no> <99Oct19.142341est.40352@border.alcanet.com.au> <19991019105525.A82390@bitbox.follo.net>

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On 1999-Oct-19 18:55:25 +1000, Eivind Eklund wrote:
>On Tue, Oct 19, 1999 at 02:27:48PM +1000, Peter Jeremy wrote:
>[On using sysctl's for securelevel-style capabilities that can be
> dropped]
>> The disadvantage of this approach is kernel bloat: Each sysctl adds
>> around 50 bytes of data overhead on an i386 (and about twice this on
>> an Alpha).  A single bitmap (which could still be a sysctl) of allowed
>> syscalls would be substantially smaller and allow most of the permission
>> checking inside trap.c:syscall().

Maybe I should have thought through this more completely...

>First of all, I do not believe that the syscalls provide an adequate
>mapping to which things you want to protect against.

Agreed - in most cases, a high `securelevel' requires restricting
the functionality of a syscall, rather than totally blocking the
syscall.

>Second, looking at the syscall list, I find the following syscalls you
>might want to block

I hadn't worked through this.  If it's only 20-30 system calls, then
the sysctl approach is probably reasonable.  I was concerned that
we might be talking about adding this to the majority of syscalls.

> (and which are not already handled by securelevel
>(with better semantics)):

I thought that one of the ideas here was to dump the existing
securelevel and replace it with a more fine-grained approach (similar
to capabilities).

>If the kernel bloat is seen as a problem,

In this case, it's probably not a problem.  IMHO, we should consider
the bloat factor when looking at new features - we're not trying to
emulate Windoze2000.

Peter
-- 
Peter Jeremy (VK2PJ)                    peter.jeremy@alcatel.com.au
Alcatel Australia Limited
41 Mandible St                          Phone: +61 2 9690 5019
ALEXANDRIA  NSW  2015                   Fax:   +61 2 9690 5982




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