From owner-cvs-all Tue Dec 11 11:48: 2 2001 Delivered-To: cvs-all@freebsd.org Received: from westhost36.westhost.net (westhost36.westhost.net [216.71.84.209]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D152E37B41C; Tue, 11 Dec 2001 11:47:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (haikugeek@localhost) by westhost36.westhost.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id fBBJkZ305989; Tue, 11 Dec 2001 13:46:35 -0600 Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2001 13:46:35 -0600 (CST) From: Jon Mini X-X-Sender: To: Paul Richards Cc: John Baldwin , Wilko Bulte , , , , Alfred Perlstein , Mike Silbersack , Mike Barcroft Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/boot/i386/loader version src/share/examp In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG On Tue, 11 Dec 2001, Jon Mini wrote: > On Tue, 11 Dec 2001, Paul Richards wrote: > > > Would it be difficult to add some crypt functions to the loader so that the > > root passwd can be checked against /etc/master.passwd? The secure console > > protection can then be pulled forward to earlier in the boot process. > > No, that would be trivial. Writing the forth to parse /etc/passwd.master > would be a little more annoying, but not much. > Though, it should be noted that if you're going to be totally secure, even interrupting the boot process and leaving the system sitting a password prompt is a valid DOS attack on the system. Also, putting a rock on the spacebar would probably do the trick as well. The boot loader isn't even vaguely secure.. if we want a secure console, then we should really just come up with a different method of booting. I've never really believed in a secure console anyways. -- Dizzy Cow (Jon Mini) dizzycow@haikugeek.com ... Desolation ... Despair ... Plastic Forks ... ~ ~ ~ To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message