From owner-freebsd-audit Mon Nov 29 18: 5:48 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-audit@freebsd.org Received: from apollo.backplane.com (apollo.backplane.com [216.240.41.2]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E17AC14A21; Mon, 29 Nov 1999 18:05:16 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from dillon@apollo.backplane.com) Received: (from dillon@localhost) by apollo.backplane.com (8.9.3/8.9.1) id SAA13833; Mon, 29 Nov 1999 18:05:16 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from dillon) Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 18:05:16 -0800 (PST) From: Matthew Dillon Message-Id: <199911300205.SAA13833@apollo.backplane.com> To: Kris Kennaway Cc: Doug Barton , Dan Moschuk , arch@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/i386/conf files.i386 src/sys/kern kern_fork.c src/sys/libkern arc4random.c src/sys/sys libkern.h References: Sender: owner-freebsd-audit@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG :There will probably end up being 20 or so randomized features in the :kernel, most of them trivial (~1 line) patches. As long as they're :sysctl'able, is it really necessary to have each of them optionable? What if we just has a general security randomization option that applied to all of them, and then a sysctl to cover each of them? That would cover my concerns. -Matt To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-audit" in the body of the message