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Date:      Wed, 7 Mar 2018 07:13:11 -0800
From:      Gordon Tetlow <gordon@tetlows.org>
To:        "Philip M. Gollucci" <pgollucci@p6m7g8.com>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org, FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject:   Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp
Message-ID:  <519359A9-A123-478C-A57D-51A1D8F528CA@tetlows.org>
In-Reply-To: <CACM2dAbhK7u8Rk0Ax9i_pSxZ_gk3CZO-7yeT1iGvVd5ukQQvKQ@mail.gmail.com>
References:  <20180307071008.BB2B6447F@freefall.freebsd.org> <CACM2dAbhK7u8Rk0Ax9i_pSxZ_gk3CZO-7yeT1iGvVd5ukQQvKQ@mail.gmail.com>

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Sorry about that. I thought I had everything but I missed that piece. They s=
hould be coming shortly.

That said, I=E2=80=99m seeing reports of the ipsec patches for 10.x not comp=
iling. Will look into that shortly.=20

Gordon

> On Mar 7, 2018, at 06:40, Philip M. Gollucci <pgollucci@p6m7g8.com> wrote:=

>=20
> The links are 404ing
>=20
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 2:10 AM, FreeBSD Security Advisories <
> security-advisories@freebsd.org> wrote:
>=20
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA512
>>=20
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp                                        Security
>> Advisory
>>                                                          The FreeBSD
>> Project
>>=20
>> Topic:          Multiple vulnerabilities of ntp
>>=20
>> Category:       contrib
>> Module:         ntp
>> Announced:      2018-03-07
>> Credits:        Network Time Foundation
>> Affects:        All supported versions of FreeBSD.
>> Corrected:      2018-02-28 09:01:03 UTC (stable/11, 11.1-STABLE)
>>                2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/11.1, 11.1-RELEASE-p7)
>>                2018-03-01 04:06:49 UTC (stable/10, 10.4-STABLE)
>>                2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.4, 10.4-RELEASE-p6)
>>                2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p27)
>> CVE Name:       CVE-2018-7182, CVE-2018-7170, CVE-2018-7184, CVE-2018-718=
5,
>>                CVE-2018-7183
>>=20
>> For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
>> including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
>> following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
>>=20
>> I.   Background
>>=20
>> The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP=
)
>> used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time
>> source.
>>=20
>> II.  Problem Description
>>=20
>> The ctl_getitem() function is used by ntpd(8) to process incoming "mode 6=
"
>> packets.  A malicious "mode 6" packet can be sent to an ntpd instance, an=
d
>> if the ntpd instance is from 4.2.8p6 through 4.2.8p10, ctl_getitem() will=

>> read past the end of its buffer. [CVE-2018-7182]
>>=20
>> The ntpd(8) service can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks.  If a system is
>> configured to use a trustedkey and if one is not using the feature
>> introduced
>> in ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th field in the ntp.keys file to
>> specify
>> which IPs can serve time, a malicious authenticated peer, i.e., one where=

>> the
>> attacker knows the private symmetric key, can create arbitrarily-many
>> ephemeral associations in order to win the clock selection of ntpd and
>> modify
>> a victim's clock. [CVE-2018-7170]
>>=20
>> The fix for NtpBug2952 was incomplete, and while it fixed one problem it
>> created another.  Specifically, it drops bad packets before updating the
>> "received" timestamp.  This means a third-party can inject a packet with
>> a zero-origin timestamp, meaning the sender wants to reset the associatio=
n,
>> and the transmit timestamp in this bogus packet will be saved as the most=

>> recent "received" timestamp.  The real remote peer does not know this
>> value and this will disrupt the association until the association resets.=

>> [CVE-2018-7184]
>>=20
>> The NTP Protocol allows for both non-authenticated and authenticated
>> associations, in client/server, symmetric (peer), and several broadcast
>> modes.  In addition to the basic NTP operational modes, symmetric mode an=
d
>> broadcast servers can support an interleaved mode of operation.  In
>> ntp-4.2.8p4, a bug was inadvertently introduced into the protocol engine
>> that
>> allows a non-authenticated zero-origin (reset) packet to reset an
>> authenticated interleaved peer association.  If an attacker can send a
>> packet
>> with a zero-origin timestamp and the source IP address of the "other side=
"
>> of
>> an interleaved association, the 'victim' ntpd will reset its association.=

>> The attacker must continue sending these packets in order to maintain the=

>> disruption of the association.  [CVE-2018-7185]
>>=20
>> The ntpq(8) utility is a monitoring and control program for ntpd.  The
>> internal decodearr() function of ntpq(8) that is used to decode an array i=
n
>> a response string when formatted data is being displayed.  This is a
>> problem
>> in affected versions of ntpq if a maliciously-altered ntpd returns an arr=
ay
>> result that will trip this bug, or if a bad actor is able to read an
>> ntpq(8)
>> request on its way to a remote ntpd server and forge and send a response
>> before the remote ntpd sends its response.  It is potentially possible th=
at
>> the malicious data could become injectable/executable code. [CVE-2017-718=
3]
>>=20
>> III. Impact
>>=20
>> Malicious remote attackers may be able to break time synchornization,
>> or cause the ntpq(8) utility to crash.
>>=20
>> IV.  Workaround
>>=20
>> No workaround is available, but systems not running ntpd(8) or ntpq(8) ar=
e
>> not affected.  Network administrators are advised to implement BCP-38 whi=
ch
>> helps to reduce risk associated with the attacks.
>>=20
>> V.   Solution
>>=20
>> Perform one of the following:
>>=20
>> 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
>> release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
>>=20
>> The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update.  A reboot is
>> recommended but not required.
>>=20
>> 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
>>=20
>> Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
>> platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
>>=20
>> # freebsd-update fetch
>> # freebsd-update install
>>=20
>> The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update.  A reboot is
>> recommended but not required.
>>=20
>> 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
>>=20
>> The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
>> FreeBSD release branches.
>>=20
>> a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
>> detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
>>=20
>> [FreeBSD 11.1]
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch.asc
>> # gpg --verify ntp-11.1.patch.asc
>>=20
>> [FreeBSD 10.4]
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch.asc
>> # gpg --verify ntp-10.4.patch.asc
>>=20
>> [FreeBSD 10.3]
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch
>> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch.asc
>> # gpg --verify ntp-10.3.patch.asc
>>=20
>> b) Apply the patch.  Execute the following commands as root:
>>=20
>> # cd /usr/src
>> # patch < /path/to/patch
>>=20
>> c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
>> described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
>>=20
>> Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
>>=20
>> VI.  Correction details
>>=20
>> The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
>> affected branch.
>>=20
>> Branch/path                                                      Revision=

>> - ------------------------------------------------------------
>> -------------
>> stable/10/                                                        r330141=

>> releng/10.3/                                                      r330567=

>> releng/10.4/                                                      r330567=

>> stable/11/                                                        r330106=

>> releng/11.1/                                                      r330567=

>> - ------------------------------------------------------------
>> -------------
>>=20
>> To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
>> following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
>> machine with Subversion installed:
>>=20
>> # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
>>=20
>> Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
>>=20
>> <URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=3Drevision&revision=3DNNNNNN>;
>>=20
>> VII. References
>>=20
>> <URL:http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice#
>> February_2018_ntp_4_2_8p11_NTP_S>
>>=20
>> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2018-7182>;
>>=20
>> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2018-7170>;
>>=20
>> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2018-7184>;
>>=20
>> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2018-7185>;
>>=20
>> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2018-7183>;
>>=20
>> The latest revision of this advisory is available at
>> <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp.asc>;
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>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> _______________________________________________
>> freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org mailing list
>> https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security-notifications=

>> To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-
>> notifications-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------
> 4096R/D21D2752
> <http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=3Dget&search=3D0xF699A450D21D2752>; ECDF B=
597
> B54B 7F92 753E  E0EA F699 A450 D21D 2752
> Philip M. Gollucci (pgollucci@p6m7g8.com) c: 703.336.9354
> Member,                           Apache Software Foundation
> Committer,                        FreeBSD Foundation
> Consultant,                       P6M7G8 Inc.
> Director Cloud Technology,        Capital One
>=20
> What doesn't kill us can only make us stronger;
> Except it almost kills you.
> _______________________________________________
> freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list
> https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security
> To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscribe@freebsd.org=
"



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