From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Sep 16 17:19:11 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0901F25F for ; Tue, 16 Sep 2014 17:19:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from calvin.ustdmz.roe.ch (calvin.ustdmz.roe.ch [IPv6:2001:1620:98f:face::26]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2F87E2C for ; Tue, 16 Sep 2014 17:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from roe (ssh-from [130.59.18.75]) by calvin.ustdmz.roe.ch (envelope-from ) with LOCAL id 1XTwPC-000ISX-CD for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:19:06 +0200 Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:19:06 +0200 From: Daniel Roethlisberger To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:19.tcp Message-ID: <20140916171906.GB40056@calvin.ustdmz.roe.ch> Mail-Followup-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org References: <201409161014.s8GAE77Z070671@freefall.freebsd.org> <54180EBF.2050104@pyro.eu.org> <1410870926.3637266.168084441.4C997218@webmail.messagingengine.com> <44y4tjwvlm.fsf@lowell-desk.lan> <1410875348.3660913.168112729.18E69A9D@webmail.messagingengine.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1410875348.3660913.168112729.18E69A9D@webmail.messagingengine.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 17:19:11 -0000 Mark Felder 2014-09-16: > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014, at 08:20, Lowell Gilbert wrote: > > Spoofing traffic is pretty easy. The reason it isn't generally a problem > > is that knowing what to spoof is more difficult. [I assume that's what > > feld@ actually meant, but it's an important distinction.] > > How many AS are out there don't implement BCP38? Spoofing these days > without MITM should be considered hard, and TCP even harder, no? I'd > find it more believable that it's easier to hijack BGP than to target > someone and successfully spoof TCP. FWIW, if that assumption about the BCP38 adoption rate were true, then we would see less reflected DoS attacks than we actually do these days. -- Daniel Roethlisberger http://daniel.roe.ch/