Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 19:45:02 GMT From: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-ports-all@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-ports-main@FreeBSD.org Subject: git: 8b0c2c947dd6 - main - security/openssl31: Update to 3.1.2 Message-ID: <202308021945.372Jj2KR067483@gitrepo.freebsd.org>
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The branch main has been updated by brnrd: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/ports/commit/?id=8b0c2c947dd6b51f2e2a9046c815e6da1d0ca953 commit 8b0c2c947dd6b51f2e2a9046c815e6da1d0ca953 Author: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2023-08-02 19:44:29 +0000 Commit: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2023-08-02 19:44:29 +0000 security/openssl31: Update to 3.1.2 * MFH this version as this is a roll-up of multiple vulnerability fixes MFH: 2023Q3 --- security/openssl31/Makefile | 3 +- security/openssl31/distinfo | 6 +-- security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-2975 | 54 -------------------------- security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 | 57 ---------------------------- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/openssl31/Makefile b/security/openssl31/Makefile index 0625a0573716..e0baa28cfd53 100644 --- a/security/openssl31/Makefile +++ b/security/openssl31/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ PORTNAME= openssl -PORTVERSION= 3.1.1 -PORTREVISION= 2 +PORTVERSION= 3.1.2 CATEGORIES= security devel MASTER_SITES= https://www.openssl.org/source/ \ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ diff --git a/security/openssl31/distinfo b/security/openssl31/distinfo index 65be6f34f8a4..7bff6a06bbec 100644 --- a/security/openssl31/distinfo +++ b/security/openssl31/distinfo @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -TIMESTAMP = 1685532140 -SHA256 (openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz) = b3aa61334233b852b63ddb048df181177c2c659eb9d4376008118f9c08d07674 -SIZE (openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz) = 15544757 +TIMESTAMP = 1691004202 +SHA256 (openssl-3.1.2.tar.gz) = a0ce69b8b97ea6a35b96875235aa453b966ba3cba8af2de23657d8b6767d6539 +SIZE (openssl-3.1.2.tar.gz) = 15560427 diff --git a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-2975 b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-2975 deleted file mode 100644 index dde528e31be4..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-2975 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From 6a83f0c958811f07e0d11dfc6b5a6a98edfd5bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode - -The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items -authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length. - -The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data -which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also -a security issue because such empty associated data then become -unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them. - -Fixes CVE-2023-2975 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384) - -(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9) ---- - .../implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c | 18 +++++++++++------- - 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c -index 45010b90db2a..b396c8651a32 100644 ---- providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c.orig -+++ providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c -@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, - if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) - return 0; - -- if (inl == 0) { -- *outl = 0; -- return 1; -- } -+ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */ -+ if (out != NULL) { -+ if (inl == 0) { -+ if (outl != NULL) -+ *outl = 0; -+ return 1; -+ } - -- if (outsize < inl) { -- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); -- return 0; -+ if (outsize < inl) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); -+ return 0; -+ } - } - - if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0) diff --git a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 deleted file mode 100644 index cbb1a7ae0128..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -From 6a1eb62c29db6cb5eec707f9338aee00f44e26f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:22:48 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is - obviously invalid - -If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q -is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1. - -We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that -q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that -q value. - -Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value -such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long -computations. - -Fixes CVE-2023-3817 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> -Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550) - -(cherry picked from commit 1c16253f3c3a8d1e25918c3f404aae6a5b0893de) ---- - crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 9 ++++++++- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c -index aef6f9b1b77d..fbe279756954 100644 ---- crypto/dh/dh_check.c.orig -+++ crypto/dh/dh_check.c -@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) - #ifdef FIPS_MODULE - return DH_check_params(dh, ret); - #else -- int ok = 0, r; -+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL; - int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh); -@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) - goto err; - - if (dh->params.q != NULL) { -+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0) -+ q_good = 1; -+ else -+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE; -+ } -+ -+ if (q_good) { - if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) - *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; - else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
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