Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 08:04:10 +0100 From: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> To: Christian Baer <christian.baer@informatik.uni-dortmund.de> Cc: freebsd-geom@freebsd.org Subject: Re: -p with GELI Message-ID: <20060210070410.GD3590@garage.freebsd.pl> In-Reply-To: <dse2q1$i5h$1@nermal.rz1.convenimus.net> References: <dsdidb$gf7$1@nermal.rz1.convenimus.net> <20060208201852.GA732@garage.freebsd.pl> <dsdp4d$gf7$2@nermal.rz1.convenimus.net> <20060208224645.GF732@garage.freebsd.pl> <dse2q1$i5h$1@nermal.rz1.convenimus.net>
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--32u276st3Jlj2kUU Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-2 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 01:36:17AM +0100, Christian Baer wrote: +> On Wed, 8 Feb 2006 23:46:45 +0100 Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote: +>=20 +> > No, but you may pass 'keyfile' through standard input, so it can be +> > anything. +> > You must know, that for keyfiles PKCS#5v2 won't be used nor additional +> > salt. +>=20 +> So that means, if I init a provider without a keyfile but with a long +> passphrase, I get the benifit of PKCS#5v2 and additional salt? That is +> the way I initialized all my providers so far. Could I now use -k to +> attach the providers as shown in the script? No. If it is already initialized you can't do it. So still can change the key or just use expect. +> > This is not to prevent brute force attack, it's just better no to use +> > the same key. Actually here it is not so important as it is only used +> > for Master-Key encryption which is random. +>=20 +> But as you wrote, part of the key is random and part is derived from the +> passphrase. So each key *would* be different. +>=20 +> > Anyway, in my opnion this is the list from the safest to the most unsa= fe +> > configuration list: +> > 1. Different passphrase for every provider. +> > 2. Different key for every provider derived from the same passphrase. +> > 3. One passphrase for every provider. +>=20 +> Where is the difference between 2 and 3? When one of your keys leaked (eg. by ps(1) output or any other way), an attacker can decrypt only one disk, not three. +> [...] Is 3 "1 passphrase and 1 key +> for every provider"? Could that even be achieved? Maybe I wasn't clear there. 3rd point is what you proposed: One passphrase (the same passphrase) for all providers. --=20 Pawel Jakub Dawidek http://www.wheel.pl pjd@FreeBSD.org http://www.FreeBSD.org FreeBSD committer Am I Evil? Yes, I Am! --32u276st3Jlj2kUU Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (FreeBSD) iD8DBQFD7DrqForvXbEpPzQRApuSAJwKyJxQMGF5mRnq3AIviB0LoH19CACcDQJx XDGgezF7Ik+1vBiPLwdI8Bo= =NlcV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --32u276st3Jlj2kUU--
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