From owner-freebsd-isp@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Feb 13 17:51:53 2013 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-isp@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A265667D; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 17:51:53 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from xenophon+freebsd@irtnog.org) Received: from mx1.irtnog.org (rrcs-24-123-13-61.central.biz.rr.com [24.123.13.61]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7611334F; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 17:51:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from cinep001bsdgw.irtnog.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx1.irtnog.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0CB21C970; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 12:51:51 -0500 (EST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at irtnog.org Received: from mx1.irtnog.org ([127.0.0.1]) by cinep001bsdgw.irtnog.net (mx1.irtnog.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id L7jX3-aEx_AJ; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 12:51:46 -0500 (EST) Received: from cinip100ntsbs.irtnog.net (cinip100ntsbs.irtnog.net [10.63.1.100]) by mx1.irtnog.org (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 12:51:46 -0500 (EST) Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: RE: FreeBSD DDoS protection X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 12:51:44 -0500 Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <2107458022.140210.1360773865635@d94655abdbc041fe9f54c404b6b4e89c.nuevasync.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: FreeBSD DDoS protection Thread-Index: Ac4KCWeOCc1HOkl8RBOaRoCiIm8zagAAZPeg References: <321927899.767139.1360461430134@89b1b4b66ec741cb85480c78b68b8dce.nuevasync.com> <2107458022.140210.1360773865635@d94655abdbc041fe9f54c404b6b4e89c.nuevasync.com> From: "xenophon\\+freebsd" To: , X-BeenThere: freebsd-isp@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: Internet Services Providers List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 17:51:53 -0000 khatfield@... writes: >=20 > Please read the rest of the thread before criticizing. Let me clarify. Na=EFvely blocking ICMP isn't the only thing firewall = admins should avoid doing. I think that one should construct firewalls = in such a manner that for all prohibited classes of traffic, the = firewall should return the correct destination-unreachable messages (TCP = RST or ICMP UNREACHABLE) to the traffic source. For one, this makes the = presence of a firewall less obvious to attackers, but more importantly, = end users don't have to wait for their connections to mysteriously time = out when they do something prohibited. Black holes and null routes have = their place, such as in response to an active denial of service attack, = but not in the primary traffic control policy. --=20 I FIGHT FOR THE USERS