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Date:      Fri, 06 Oct 2000 06:01:59 -0700
From:      Cy Schubert - ITSD Open Systems Group <Cy.Schubert@uumail.gov.bc.ca>
To:        Hank Leininger <hlein@progressive-comp.com>
Cc:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: BSD chpass (fwd) 
Message-ID:  <200010061302.e96D2k345593@cwsys.cwsent.com>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 05 Oct 2000 02:23:42 EDT." <200010050623.CAA05646@mailer.progressive-comp.com> 

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In message <200010050623.CAA05646@mailer.progressive-comp.com>, Hank 
Leininger
writes:
> I've a feeling I'm (re)stating the obvious, but IMHO securelevels can't
> really permanently preserve a system's known-good state in the face of root
> compromise unless literally everything you'd ever access w/o securelevels
> raised, is fully protected when they are (in which case you'll effectively
> have everything interesting RO -- just set the RO jumper on the drive while
> you're at it).  Otherwise there will always(?) be some extra-mile way to
> circumvent them.  Of course we can devise countermeasures ad-nauseum -- for
> instance, set all dirs in root's path to schg and only set sappnd on the
> "last" one, and never change the order (silly).  Or from every directory
> "higher" in the path than a path'ed command, create a symlink to the right
> place (unspeakably ugly, but works ;)  Though you'll still have the 'sl',
> 'ls-l', etc trojan possibilities either way.

I think your first point is the only solution -- every R/O file would 
need the schg flag.  Some co-workers and I had discussed this very 
issue about 2-3 years ago.  The only solution we could arrive at was to 
burn the O/S onto a CDROM or set the R/O jumper on the drive, both of 
which would be administrative nightmares when the team administering 
the system is a ferry or helijet ride away, making managing such a 
system a very expensive proposition.

Wouldn't setting schg on every binary and every config file on the 
system and running at securelevel 2 be equally effective?  Then again 
there's the possibility of a bug in the system that would allow any 
attacker to reduce the securelevel.  So once again were faced with your 
first point as the only solution.


Regards,                       Phone:  (250)387-8437
Cy Schubert                      Fax:  (250)387-5766
Team Leader, Sun/DEC Team   Internet:  Cy.Schubert@osg.gov.bc.ca
Open Systems Group, ITSD, ISTA
Province of BC





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