From owner-freebsd-current Sun Jul 16 23: 6:44 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from grimreaper.grondar.za (grimreaper.grondar.za [196.7.18.138]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BC3C37B523; Sun, 16 Jul 2000 23:06:37 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from mark@grondar.za) Received: from grimreaper.grondar.za (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by grimreaper.grondar.za (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA05866; Mon, 17 Jul 2000 08:07:43 +0200 (SAST) (envelope-from mark@grimreaper.grondar.za) Message-Id: <200007170607.IAA05866@grimreaper.grondar.za> To: "Andrey A. Chernov" Cc: current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak References: <20000716125502.B89979@freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <20000716125502.B89979@freebsd.org> ; from "Andrey A. Chernov" "Sun, 16 Jul 2000 12:55:02 MST." Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2000 08:07:43 +0200 From: Mark Murray Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG > > The situation is _worse_; the entropy is minimal, and is _very_ attackable. > > What's wrong about timers for enthropy (I mean high resolution ones)? > Really we need only few bytes of enthropy and can use them to seed RNG for the > first time if no true randomness available. To be joking: MD5 of kernel module > can help too :-) getnanotime() is already extensively used; we just need to force the RNG to reseed once at the beginning. As soon as I'm happy that the code is panic-free, I'll commit it. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message