From owner-freebsd-current Wed Dec 16 07:51:12 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id HAA00591 for freebsd-current-outgoing; Wed, 16 Dec 1998 07:51:12 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from server.noc.demon.net (server.noc.demon.net [193.195.224.4]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id HAA00577 for ; Wed, 16 Dec 1998 07:51:06 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from fanf@demon.net) Received: by server.noc.demon.net; id PAA11649; Wed, 16 Dec 1998 15:51:00 GMT Received: from fanf.noc.demon.net(195.11.55.83) by inside.noc.demon.net via smap (3.2) id xma011639; Wed, 16 Dec 98 15:50:48 GMT Received: from fanf by fanf.noc.demon.net with local (Exim 1.73 #2) id 0zqJIp-0000QT-00; Wed, 16 Dec 1998 15:55:55 +0000 To: current@FreeBSD.ORG From: Tony Finch Subject: Re: modification to exec in the kernel? Newsgroups: chiark.mail.freebsd.current In-Reply-To: <199812151650.SAA68842@greenpeace.grondar.za> Organization: Deliberate Obfuscation To Amuse Tony References: <19981215120357.B11837@clear.co.nz> <199812142331.RAA17203@home.dragondata.com> <19981215124818.A22526@clear.co.nz> <199812150644.IAA67338@greenpeace.grondar.za> <199812150917.BAA52694@apollo.backplane.com> <19981216053701.B27078@clear.co.nz> <19981216053701.B27078@clear.co.nz> Message-Id: Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1998 15:55:55 +0000 Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG Mark Murray wrote: >Joe Abley wrote: >> So how is this more dangerous than a non-chrooted environment? Surely it >> is _as_ safe - but with the added control that the user sees an appropriate >> subset of the entire filesystem that is controlled, regardless of what the >> system as a whole needs to have installed in order to function? > >You give the user Perl5, you may as well give them a C compiler. >They'll have full access to sockets etc. Who knows what nasty >attacks they can launch against you from inside your own network. I think some sort of firewalling is the answer here. >Given that the chroot'ed environment is "sanitised", it becomes >easy to control (within its limits) and understand. I am not >proposing security-by-obsurity here, just that you either make it >"UNIX" and go with that warts-and-all (security patrols necessary), >or make it tighter than a mouse's arse (and non-useful to >scriptwriters). Depends on the script -- if the only executable you allow the users access to is perl it's still a useful environment. Tony. -- f.a.n.finch.523654357374743743747333764375697569700 fanf@demon.net dot@dotat.at To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message