Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1998 16:07:35 +0000 From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> To: current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: modification to exec in the kernel? Message-ID: <E0zqJU7-0000RJ-00@fanf.noc.demon.net> In-Reply-To: <199812151821.KAA56685@apollo.backplane.com> References: <19981215120357.B11837@clear.co.nz> <199812142331.RAA17203@home.dragondata.com> <19981215124818.A22526@clear.co.nz> <199812150644.IAA67338@greenpeace.grondar.za> <199812150917.BAA52694@apollo.backplane.com> <19981216053701.B27078@clear.co.nz>
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Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com> wrote:
>
> I don't see the point. Let me put it this way: If you give
> the user a non-chrooted environment but do not give the user access
> to any suid/sgid programs, how is this different from giving the user
> a chroot'd environment without access to any suid/sgid programs? The
> only difference that I can think of is access to /tmp. I don't see how
> the chroot'd environment is any safer then the non-chroot'd environment.
You can throw away a lot of stuff from the chrooted environment and
still leave the system useful to the admins. AFAICT breaking root in
an environment like this is much more like trying to do so over the
network because the machine's services are only accessible in that
sort of way.
This does assume the integrity of the kernel, though.
Tony.
--
dxoigmn**f.a.n.finch
fanf@demon.net
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