From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Sun Feb 24 17:51:40 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E17116A402 for ; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 17:51:40 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from wmoran@collaborativefusion.com) Received: from mx00.pub.collaborativefusion.com (mx00.pub.collaborativefusion.com [206.210.89.199]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11A7013C448 for ; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 17:51:39 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from wmoran@collaborativefusion.com) Received: from working (c-71-60-127-199.hsd1.pa.comcast.net [71.60.127.199]) (AUTH: LOGIN wmoran, SSL: TLSv1/SSLv3,256bits,AES256-SHA) by wingspan with esmtp; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 12:51:39 -0500 id 0005642C.47C1AEAB.00013E2E Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 12:51:38 -0500 From: Bill Moran To: Christopher Arnold Message-Id: <20080224125138.b56cab48.wmoran@collaborativefusion.com> In-Reply-To: <20080224165956.X34646@localhost> References: <47C06E1F.5020308@thedarkside.nl> <760775.85636.qm@web50306.mail.re2.yahoo.com> <20080223203316.GC38485@lor.one-eyed-alien.net> <20080224100924.c8e08776.wmoran@collaborativefusion.com> <20080224165956.X34646@localhost> Organization: Collaborative Fusion Inc. X-Mailer: Sylpheed 2.4.7 (GTK+ 2.12.1; i386-portbld-freebsd6.2) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: hackers@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 17:51:40 -0000 Christopher Arnold wrote: > > > > On Sun, 24 Feb 2008, Bill Moran wrote: > > > Or laptop vendors could make "secure" laptops that always lose memory > > on shutdown. > > > That dosn't really change anything, just don't shutdown the laptop. It reduces the risk greatly when combined with other measures. For example, alter the sysctls so the lid switch powers the laptop off instead of putting it to sleep. This changes the scene a good bit, as it's guaranteed to be powered off when in storage and transport, which is when it is most likely to be stolen. > Cut an opening in the case and attach a probe to monitor memory access and > wait for the key being accessed. That attack only works if you can steal the laptop when it's powered on. With a unit known to be a security risk, it's going to be monitored while powered on, so it's less likely to be stolen at that time. As far as mitigation is concerned, there's not 1 or 0. But smart deployment can reduce the risks. -- Bill Moran Collaborative Fusion Inc. wmoran@collaborativefusion.com Phone: 412-422-3463x4023