From owner-svn-src-head@freebsd.org Fri Dec 11 00:26:49 2020 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A341C4BD64A; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CsWn54JJpz4Xq2; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86A4221F6F; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 0BB0Qni6078133; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 GMT (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from ngie@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 0BB0QnEi078132; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 GMT (envelope-from ngie@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <202012110026.0BB0QnEi078132@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: ngie set sender to ngie@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Enji Cooper Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r368536 - head/lib/libc/sys X-SVN-Group: head X-SVN-Commit-Author: ngie X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/lib/libc/sys X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 368536 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: base MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 00:26:49 -0000 Author: ngie Date: Fri Dec 11 00:26:49 2020 New Revision: 368536 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/368536 Log: cap_enter(2): fix CAVEATS section The CAVEATS section was misspelled as "CAVEAT" before this change. Fix the spelling to identify issues related to the section. Furthermore, given that the section order was incorrect, move the CAVEATS section down to the bottom of the manpage, per the conventional section order. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: make manlint Sponsored by: DellEMC Isilon Modified: head/lib/libc/sys/cap_enter.2 Modified: head/lib/libc/sys/cap_enter.2 ============================================================================== --- head/lib/libc/sys/cap_enter.2 Fri Dec 11 00:25:34 2020 (r368535) +++ head/lib/libc/sys/cap_enter.2 Fri Dec 11 00:26:49 2020 (r368536) @@ -97,19 +97,6 @@ and operations of the .Xr procctl 2 function for similar per-process functionality. -.Sh CAVEAT -Creating effective process sandboxes is a tricky process that involves -identifying the least possible rights required by the process and then -passing those rights into the process in a safe manner. -Consumers of -.Fn cap_enter -should also be aware of other inherited rights, such as access to VM -resources, memory contents, and other process properties that should be -considered. -It is advisable to use -.Xr fexecve 2 -to create a runtime environment inside the sandbox that has as few implicitly -acquired rights as possible. .Sh RETURN VALUES .Rv -std cap_enter cap_getmode .Pp @@ -162,3 +149,16 @@ These functions and the capability facility were creat .An "Robert N. M. Watson" at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc. +.Sh CAVEATS +Creating effective process sandboxes is a tricky process that involves +identifying the least possible rights required by the process and then +passing those rights into the process in a safe manner. +Consumers of +.Fn cap_enter +should also be aware of other inherited rights, such as access to VM +resources, memory contents, and other process properties that should be +considered. +It is advisable to use +.Xr fexecve 2 +to create a runtime environment inside the sandbox that has as few implicitly +acquired rights as possible.