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Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
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Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 14:03:00 +0200
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To: clopez@softlayer.com
Organization: Carlo Strub
From: Carlo Strub <cs@FreeBSD.org>
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10/04/2014 12:58 - Cyrus Lopez wrote:

>=20
>=20
> >>=20
> >> SSH is not affected.
> >>=20
> >=20
> > SSH is indeed not affected, but I guess you should still consider the s=
ecret sshd key on your otherwise affected server as burnt, as it might have=
 been in the memory too while an attacker was inspecting it via heartbleed.=
 Better recreate the secret ssh key and all other secret keys on your serve=
r as well. But, again, the OpenSSH protocol/software per se are not affecte=
d.
>=20
>=20
> This is incorrect. The heartbleed exploit would have only returned portio=
ns of
> memory that were under the control of OpenSSL, not general memory used by=
 other
> processes on the system.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20


Thanks for the update. I wasn't aware of that.=