Date: Thu, 04 Jan 2001 21:21:17 +0200 From: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> To: Garrett Wollman <wollman@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> Cc: cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/usr.bin/apply apply.c Message-ID: <200101041921.f04JLLY07292@gratis.grondar.za> In-Reply-To: <200101041909.OAA61522@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> ; from Garrett Wollman <wollman@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> "Thu, 04 Jan 2001 14:09:53 EST." References: <200101041909.OAA61522@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu>
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> <<On Thu, 4 Jan 2001 11:05:49 -0800 (PST), Will Andrews <will@FreeBSD.org> said:
>
> > Use getusershell() to make sure the SHELL environment variable passed is
> > safe to use. Add new option -s to allow anal users to pass things like
> > perl; this option is here along with getusershell() checking since the
> > such checking is only intended to affect things like suidperl that might
> > call apply(1).
>
> What is the reason for this change?
Source code clean-up A' la BDEFLAGS.
> I see no benefit in modifying many programs in this manner which do
> not ordinarily run with elevated privileges.
IMO, all programs that run ${SHELL} should do this. One less thing
to worry about.
Any runshell(3) call (I know there is not one ATM) should have
this functionality by default.
> It is the responsibility of those programs that do, to ensure that the
> environment passed to their children is safe and sane.
That is a fine supplement. We all know how well users write their
scripts :-).
M
--
Mark Murray
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