From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Sep 7 11:40:22 2006 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Delivered-To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9312716A4DD for ; Thu, 7 Sep 2006 11:40:22 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from trhodes@FreeBSD.org) Received: from pittgoth.com (ns1.pittgoth.com [216.38.206.188]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB6FA43D49 for ; Thu, 7 Sep 2006 11:40:21 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from trhodes@FreeBSD.org) Received: from localhost (net-ix.gw.ai.net [205.134.160.6] (may be forged)) (authenticated bits=0) by pittgoth.com (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k87BeFwv016577 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 7 Sep 2006 07:40:15 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from trhodes@FreeBSD.org) Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2006 07:40:07 -0400 From: Tom Rhodes To: des@des.no (Dag-Erling =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Sm=F8rgrav?=) Message-Id: <20060907074007.5bc2c91e.trhodes@FreeBSD.org> In-Reply-To: <86ejun53cu.fsf@dwp.des.no> References: <86ejun53cu.fsf@dwp.des.no> Organization: The FreeBSD Project X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 1.0.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i386-portbld-freebsd7.0) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 07 Sep 2006 12:09:04 +0000 Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org, solinym@gmail.com Subject: Re: comments on handbook chapter X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Sep 2006 11:40:22 -0000 On Thu, 07 Sep 2006 13:21:37 +0200 des@des.no (Dag-Erling Sm=F8rgrav) wrote: > "Travis H." writes: > > ``You do not want to overbuild your security or you will interfere > > with the detection side, and detection is one of the single most > > important aspects of any security mechanism. For example, it makes > > little sense to set the schg flag (see chflags(1)) on every system > > binary because while this may temporarily protect the binaries, it > > prevents an attacker who has broken in from making an easily > > detectable change that may result in your security mechanisms not > > detecting the attacker at all.'' >=20 > Uh? Since when do we have crap like that in the handbook? It should > be removed with extreme prejudice. >=20 Grepping three of these lines, I cannot find it. Tell me Travis, what URL did you read this from? --=20 Tom Rhodes