Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Sun, 5 May 2002 19:46:43 -0400
From:      Anthony Schneider <aschneid@mail.slc.edu>
To:        Colin Percival <colin.percival@wadham.ox.ac.uk>
Cc:        ReDeeMeR <g0tr00t@usa.net>, FreeBSD-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Buffer overflow in /usr/games/strfile
Message-ID:  <20020505194643.A934@mail.slc.edu>
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.1.20020505224651.00afbd78@popserver.sfu.ca>; from colin.percival@wadham.ox.ac.uk on Sun, May 05, 2002 at 11:27:49PM %2B0100
References:  <20020505213314.8762.qmail@uwdvg007.cms.usa.net> <5.0.2.1.1.20020505224651.00afbd78@popserver.sfu.ca>

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help

--TB36FDmn/VVEgNH/
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Sun, May 05, 2002 at 11:27:49PM +0100, Colin Percival wrote:
>    Given that this is not a security issue -- as you point out, "no extra=
=20
> privileges can be gained" -- this is rather off-topic for -security;=20
> nevertheless, it is less so than discussions of mailing list sender=20
> restrictions, so I'll go ahead and respond.

I agree that it is not an *active* security hazard, however, it is a
potential security hazard were some other extra-privileged program to rely
on strfile's functionality for whatever purpose (think termcap buffer
overflows...termcap itself, a library, is not a setuid application, but
xterm, which runs setuid root, replies on termcap, and buffer overflows
have occurred where a user crafts a malicious termcap file and launches
xterm, overflowing a buffer in some termcap routine, and getting dropped
to a shell with the same privileges that xterm was run under).

/$.02

-Anthony.

-----------------------------------------------
PGP key at:
    http://www.keyserver.net/
    http://www.anthonydotcom.com/gpgkey/key.txt
Home:
    http://www.anthonydotcom.com
-----------------------------------------------


--TB36FDmn/VVEgNH/
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
Content-Disposition: inline

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org

iEYEARECAAYFAjzVxGMACgkQ+rDjkNht5F1MqACeIjkLhrkRy02TWjq0690VWXct
/78AnjtsFBR7qtpc/4t4Eg0bOA5Vx57B
=xgwR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--TB36FDmn/VVEgNH/--

To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message




Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?20020505194643.A934>