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Date:      Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:49:32 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Tijl Coosemans <tijl@FreeBSD.org>
To:        ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r547782 - head/security/vuxml
Message-ID:  <202009061049.086AnWvg002856@repo.freebsd.org>

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Author: tijl
Date: Sun Sep  6 10:49:31 2020
New Revision: 547782
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/547782

Log:
  Document Mbed TLS 2020-09-1 and 2020-09-2.
  
  Security:	https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1
  Security:	https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2

Modified:
  head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml

Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Sun Sep  6 10:25:41 2020	(r547781)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Sun Sep  6 10:49:31 2020	(r547782)
@@ -58,6 +58,73 @@ Notes:
   * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.)
 -->
 <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">;
+  <vuln vid="bcdeb6d2-f02d-11ea-838a-0011d823eebd">
+    <topic>Mbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on RSA and static Diffie-Hellman</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>mbedtls</name>
+	<range><lt>2.16.8</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2">;
+	  <p>An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access
+	    information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a
+	    secure enclave such as SGX or the TrustZone secure world) can
+	    recover the private keys used in RSA or static (finite-field)
+	    Diffie-Hellman operations.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <url>https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2</url>;
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2020-09-01</discovery>
+      <entry>2020-09-06</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="4c69240f-f02c-11ea-838a-0011d823eebd">
+    <topic>Mbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on classical CBC decryption in (D)TLS</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>mbedtls</name>
+	<range><lt>2.16.8</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">;
+	<p>Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1">;
+	  <p>When decrypting/authenticating (D)TLS record in a connection using
+	    a CBC ciphersuite without the Encrypt-then-Mac extension RFC 7366,
+	    Mbed TLS used dummy rounds of the compression function associated
+	    with the hash used for HMAC in order to hide the length of the
+	    padding to remote attackers, as recommended in the original Lucky
+	    Thirteen paper.</p>
+	  <p>A local attacker who is able to observe the state of the cache
+	    could monitor the presence of mbedtls_md_process() in the cache in
+	    order to determine when the actual computation ends and when the
+	    dummy rounds start. This is a reliable target as it's always called
+	    at least once, in response to a previous attack. The attacker can
+	    then continue with one of many well-documented Lucky 13
+	    variants.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <url>https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1</url>;
+      <cvename>CVE-2020-16150</cvename>
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2020-09-01</discovery>
+      <entry>2020-09-06</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
   <vuln vid="2272e6f1-f029-11ea-838a-0011d823eebd">
     <topic>GnuTLS -- null pointer dereference</topic>
     <affects>



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