From owner-svn-src-head@freebsd.org Wed May 24 16:30:39 2017 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C06A1D7C9A8; Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:39 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from asomers@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8CF48166D; Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:39 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from asomers@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id v4OGUcLs003067; Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:38 GMT (envelope-from asomers@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from asomers@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id v4OGUcrS003066; Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:38 GMT (envelope-from asomers@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201705241630.v4OGUcrS003066@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: asomers set sender to asomers@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Alan Somers Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:38 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r318790 - head/usr.sbin/bootparamd/bootparamd X-SVN-Group: head MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 16:30:39 -0000 Author: asomers Date: Wed May 24 16:30:38 2017 New Revision: 318790 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/318790 Log: Fix a buffer overflow in bootparamd(8) If /etc/bootparams contains a line with an excessively long pathname, and a client asks for that path, then bootparamd will overflow a buffer and crash while parsing that line. This is not remotely exploitable since it requires a malformed /etc/bootparams file. Reported by: Coverity CID: 1305954 MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Spectra Logic Corp Modified: head/usr.sbin/bootparamd/bootparamd/bootparamd.c Modified: head/usr.sbin/bootparamd/bootparamd/bootparamd.c ============================================================================== --- head/usr.sbin/bootparamd/bootparamd/bootparamd.c Wed May 24 14:36:51 2017 (r318789) +++ head/usr.sbin/bootparamd/bootparamd/bootparamd.c Wed May 24 16:30:38 2017 (r318790) @@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ int blen; int ch, pch, fid_len, res = 0; int match = 0; - char info[MAX_FILEID + MAX_PATH_LEN+MAX_MACHINE_NAME + 3]; +#define INFOLEN 1343 + _Static_assert(INFOLEN >= MAX_FILEID + MAX_PATH_LEN+MAX_MACHINE_NAME + 3, + "INFOLEN isn't large enough"); + char info[INFOLEN + 1]; bpf = fopen(bootpfile, "r"); if ( ! bpf ) @@ -251,8 +254,9 @@ int blen; info of the file */ if (match) { - fid_len = strlen(fileid); - while ( ! res && (fscanf(bpf,"%s", info)) > 0) { /* read a string */ +#define AS_FORMAT(d) "%" #d "s" +#define REXPAND(d) AS_FORMAT(d) /* Force another preprocessor expansion */ + while ( ! res && (fscanf(bpf, REXPAND(INFOLEN), info)) > 0) { ch = getc(bpf); /* and a character */ if ( *info != '#' ) { /* Comment ? */ if (! strncmp(info, fileid, fid_len) && *(info + fid_len) == '=') {