From owner-freebsd-hackers Wed Apr 5 17:23:29 1995 Return-Path: hackers-owner Received: (from majordom@localhost) by freefall.cdrom.com (8.6.10/8.6.6) id RAA06414 for hackers-outgoing; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 17:23:29 -0700 Received: from ref.tfs.com (ref.tfs.com [140.145.254.251]) by freefall.cdrom.com (8.6.10/8.6.6) with ESMTP id RAA06408 ; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 17:23:28 -0700 Received: (from phk@localhost) by ref.tfs.com (8.6.8/8.6.6) id RAA10342; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 17:23:27 -0700 From: Poul-Henning Kamp Message-Id: <199504060023.RAA10342@ref.tfs.com> Subject: Re: 2-way CTM? To: jkh@FreeBSD.org (Jordan K. Hubbard) Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 17:23:27 -0700 (PDT) Cc: hackers@FreeBSD.org In-Reply-To: <199504012105.NAA19694@time.cdrom.com> from "Jordan K. Hubbard" at Apr 1, 95 01:05:17 pm Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1646 Sender: hackers-owner@FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk > You know, it would be very very cool if Joe Developer sitting out on the > end of a SLIP line could make contributions via a sort of "reverse CTM". Yes. > to a submissions list. You should be able to do something like: > cd /usr/src/usr.bin/tip ctm_save tip.c foo.h bar.c > > ... The feature to enable this is planned, and somebody needs to do it. The ctm_save step is needed to grap a copy before hacking commences. > Also, back to CTM updates for a moment. I think these need to be > PGP'd, sequence numbered or simply obfuscated somehow before we go "live" > with CTM. It's just too easy to hose someone's tree and trojan-horse the > heck out of them by spoofing CTM the way it is now, and we have enough > security hole problems on the Internet without us making more of them. > Anyone want to work on this, too? I looked at the PGP issue, it's not quite trivial, but it can be done. > I think it's very safe to say that Poul-Henning is kind of out of the picture > on all of this due to impending Paternity, so if this stuff is going to get > done it's going to be because somebody _fresher_ steps into the breach! :-) > > Volunteers? No shoving.. :-) The rumours of my disconnection are quite exaggerated at this time... OK, to be specific, can I have somebody volounteer for these tasks: 1: Implement /etc/ctmcap in the ctm_rmail and ctm programs. 2: Make the #ctm feature. 3: Look into PGP signatures from cronjobs -- Poul-Henning Kamp -- TRW Financial Systems, Inc. 'All relevant people are pertinent' && 'All rude people are impertinent' => 'no rude people are relevant'