From owner-freebsd-security Tue Jul 9 14:34:22 1996 Return-Path: owner-security Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) id OAA09474 for security-outgoing; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 14:34:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from passer.osg.gov.bc.ca (passer.osg.gov.bc.ca [142.32.110.29]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id OAA09452 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 14:34:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by passer.osg.gov.bc.ca (8.7.5/8.6.10) with SMTP id OAA16884 for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 14:34:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Cy Schubert - ITSD Open Systems Group Message-Id: <199607092134.OAA16884@passer.osg.gov.bc.ca> X-Authentication-Warning: passer.osg.gov.bc.ca: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol Reply-to: cschuber@orca.gov.bc.ca X-Mailer: DXmail To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: CERT Advisory CA-96.13 - Vulnerability in the dip program Date: Tue, 09 Jul 96 14:34:14 -0700 X-Mts: smtp Sender: owner-security@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk I believe that the dip program used under FreeBSD is the same program as described below. We're probably vulnerable. Regards, Phone: (604)389-3827 Cy Schubert OV/VM: BCSC02(CSCHUBER) Open Systems Support BITNET: CSCHUBER@BCSC02.BITNET ITSD Internet: cschuber@uumail.gov.bc.ca cschuber@bcsc02.gov.bc.ca "Quit spooling around, JES do it." ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: cert-advisory-request@cert.org Delivery-Date: Tue, 09 Jul 96 14:30:11 -0700 Return-Path: cert-advisory-request@cert.org Received: from orca.gov.bc.ca (ORCA.gov.bc.ca [142.32.102.25]) by passer.osg.gov.bc.ca (8.7.5/8.6.10) with SMTP id OAA16819 for ; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 14:30:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from why.cert.org by orca.gov.bc.ca (5.4R3.10/200.1.1.4) id AA19326; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 14:30:04 -0700 Received: (from cert-advisory@localhost) by why.cert.org (8.6.12/CERT-ecd.1) id NAA05679 for cert-advisory-queue-4; Tue, 9 Jul 1996 13:22:14 -0400 Date: Tue, 9 Jul 1996 13:22:14 -0400 Message-Id: <199607091722.NAA05679@why.cert.org> From: CERT Advisory To: cert-advisory@cert.org Subject: CERT Advisory CA-96.13 - Vulnerability in the dip program Reply-To: cert-advisory-request@cert.org Organization: CERT(sm) Coordination Center - +1 412-268-7090 - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.13 July 9, 1996 Topic: Vulnerability in the dip program - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received several reports of exploitations of a vulnerability in the dip program on Linux systems. The dip program is shipped with most versions of the Linux system; and versions up to and including version 3.3.7n are vulnerable. An exploitation script for Linux running on X86-based hardware is publicly available. Although exploitation scripts for other architectures and operating systems have not yet been found, we believe that they could be easily developed. The CERT Coordination Center recommends that you disable dip and re-enable it only after you have installed a new version. Section III below describes how to do that. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.13.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. - - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description dip is a freely available program that is included in most distributions of Linux. It is possible to build it for and use it on other UNIX systems. The dip program manages the connections needed for dial-up links such as SLIP and PPP. It can handle both incoming and outgoing connections. To gain access to resources it needs to establish these IP connections, the dip program must be installed as set-user-id root. A vulnerability in dip makes it possible to overflow an internal buffer whose value is under the control of the user of the dip program. If this buffer is overflowed with the appropriate data, a program such as a shell can be started. This program then runs with root permissions on the local machine. Exploitation scripts for dip have been found running on Linux systems for X86 hardware. Although exploitation scripts for other architectures and operating systems have not yet been found, we believe that they could be easily developed. II. Impact On a system that has dip installed as set-user-id root, anyone with access to an account on that system can gain root access. III. Solution Follow the steps in Section A to disable your currently installed version of dip. Then, if you need the functionality that dip provides, follow the steps given in Section B. A. Disable the presently installed version of dip. As root, chmod 0755 /usr/sbin/dip By default, dip is installed in the /usr/sbin directory. Note that it may be installed elsewhere on your system. B. Install a new version of dip. If you need the functionality that dip provides, retrieve and install the following version of the source code for dip, which fixes this vulnerability. dip is available from ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Network/serial/dip/dip337o-uri.tgz ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Network/serial/dip/dip337o-uri.tgz.sig MD5 (dip337o-uri.tgz) = 45fc2a9abbcb3892648933cadf7ba090 SHash (dip337o-uri.tgz) = 6e3848b9b5f9d5b308bbac104eaf858be4dc51dc - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Uri Blumenthal for his solution to the problem and Linux for their support in the development of this advisory. - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key CERT Contact Information - - ------------------------ Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available for anonymous FTP from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request@cert.org Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.13.dip_vul http://www.cert.org click on "CERT Advisories" - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMeJzdXVP+x0t4w7BAQEJdAQAt0Y9zXDjpeuRYFI+vmceXpHL8QJPm1GL zArG5qhGx5+9hTioQCUiq/kl6uXMI0IAbfdwDG3I0wg5i7Jvi8PLYyDujpl8+gVT jzJFEQ/S9CjZ6LUxzo2Twg90urQrphFzwnY4L5DVEftKaoL1zCpg6i4SadC7vQUm n0HWkh7kV4M= =zcQN - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------- End of Forwarded Message