From owner-freebsd-security Tue Jul 13 10:23:51 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from apollo.backplane.com (apollo.backplane.com [209.157.86.2]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59A3115176; Tue, 13 Jul 1999 10:23:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dillon@apollo.backplane.com) Received: (from dillon@localhost) by apollo.backplane.com (8.9.3/8.9.1) id KAA79286; Tue, 13 Jul 1999 10:23:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from dillon) Date: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 10:23:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Matthew Dillon Message-Id: <199907131723.KAA79286@apollo.backplane.com> To: Robert Watson Cc: Doug Rabson , Mark Newton , Mike Tancsa , security@FreeBSD.ORG, stable@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: 3.x backdoor rootshell security hole References: Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org :> :> Hmm. Shouldn't we protect the contents of /boot with the schg flag? : :Ideally some of the directories themselves, as well as /boot, parts of :/etc large parts of /sbin and /bin (including sh, as that gets run in :single-user mode)... My feeling is we should maintain a list, but not :ship that way as it would be irritating for most of the world. At one :point I had a script that did some of the work, but currently due to file :layout and the way we do config files, you end up with a fairly hobbled :machine. Which is, of course, the idea. :-) I think security(8) (?) :discusses a fair amount of this stuff. : : Robert N M Watson : :robert@fledge.watson.org http://www.watson.org/~robert/ Anyone serious enough and paranoid enough simply mounts / and /usr read-only, then bumps the security level up. -Matt Matthew Dillon To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message