From owner-freebsd-security Fri Dec 18 12:02:22 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id MAA22473 for freebsd-security-outgoing; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 12:02:22 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (critter.freebsd.dk [212.242.40.131]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id MAA22456 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 12:02:16 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from phk@critter.freebsd.dk) Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by critter.freebsd.dk (8.9.1/8.8.5) with ESMTP id VAA11084; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 21:00:56 +0100 (CET) To: "Marco Molteni" cc: "Jordan K. Hubbard" , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: A better explanation (was: buffer overflows and chroot) In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 18 Dec 1998 19:57:07 +0100." Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1998 21:00:56 +0100 Message-ID: <11082.914011256@critter.freebsd.dk> From: Poul-Henning Kamp Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Marco and others. I have a set of patches which makes a chroot jail escape proof. These were developed under contract and will end up in FreeBSD sometime over the next year. My client wants to get a head start, and that is only fair. The basic concept is that root is only root in a jail if the filesystem protects the rest of the system, otherwise he isn't. For instance he can change the owner or modes on a file, but he cannot change IP# on an interface. He can bind to a priviledged TCP port, but only on the IP# which belongs to the jail. And so forth. Works pretty well. -- Poul-Henning Kamp FreeBSD coreteam member phk@FreeBSD.ORG "Real hackers run -current on their laptop." "ttyv0" -- What UNIX calls a $20K state-of-the-art, 3D, hi-res color terminal To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message