From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Jan 29 14:21:12 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 427F3196 for ; Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:21:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from sola.nimnet.asn.au (paqi.nimnet.asn.au [115.70.110.159]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6973FFA for ; Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:21:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sola.nimnet.asn.au (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id t0TEKu0F037375; Fri, 30 Jan 2015 01:20:56 +1100 (EST) (envelope-from smithi@nimnet.asn.au) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 01:20:56 +1100 (EST) From: Ian Smith To: jungle Boogie Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <20150130011402.P36378@sola.nimnet.asn.au> References: <20150128194011.2175B19F@hub.freebsd.org> <20150128211910.80082283DA18@rock.dv.isc.org> <54C966BF.9000803@rewt.org.uk> <54C9837C.8090704@akips.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Nick Frampton X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:21:12 -0000 On Wed, 28 Jan 2015 17:01:50 -0800, jungle Boogie wrote: > Hi Nick, > On Jan 28, 2015 4:56 PM, "Nick Frampton" wrote: > > > > On 29/01/15 08:46, Joe Holden wrote: > >> > >> Really, how many SCTP users are there om the wild... maybe one? > >> > >> It shouldn't be in GENERIC at the very least! > > > > > > We use Netflow over SCTP in our network monitoring product, so it would > be a pain to have to build a custom kernel. > > But also a pain to have an exploit when it could be prevented. Are you vulnerable to an SCTP exploit if you're not using SCTP? > Its all about trade offs, right? I seem to recall similar resistance to including IPv6 into GENERIC .. It _would_ be good to know more about who's using SCTP, and for what usage cases it has tangible benefits over TCP, but I guess not here. cheers, Ian