From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Thu Jan 4 15:03:25 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8B2EEBAE5C for ; Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:03:25 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from smtp.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F0EB6D7D7 for ; Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:03:25 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from desk.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by smtp.des.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id 450A410479; Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:03:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by desk.des.no (Postfix, from userid 1001) id DC26C5CE0B; Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:01:51 +0000 (UTC) From: =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= To: Erich Dollansky Cc: "Ronald F. Guilmette" , "freebsd-security\@freebsd.org" Subject: Re: Intel hardware bug References: <02563ce4-437c-ab96-54bb-a8b591900ba0@FreeBSD.org> <19876.1515025752@segfault.tristatelogic.com> <20180104132807.266fe46c.freebsd.ed.lists@sumeritec.com> Date: Thu, 04 Jan 2018 16:01:51 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20180104132807.266fe46c.freebsd.ed.lists@sumeritec.com> (Erich Dollansky's message of "Thu, 4 Jan 2018 13:28:07 +0800") Message-ID: <86vaghu0ps.fsf@desk.des.no> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.3 (berkeley-unix) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Jan 2018 15:03:25 -0000 Erich Dollansky writes: > Intel used segments to separate things everybody hated. Everybody hated segment-level memory protection, but the i386 also introduced page-level memory protection, which was widely used and has since been expanded to provide features that were never available at the segment level. > Intel introduced later the rings, everybody ignored. Not at all. They just don't use all four. Unless you start looking at hardware virtualization extensions, which introduce additional protection levels. > Instead of keeping the things separated - as suggested by Intel's > design - people used shortcuts whenever possible. This is irrelevant. We are talking about timing-based side-channel attacks. The attacker is not able to access protected memory directly, but is able to deduce its contents by repeatedly performing illegal memory accesses and then checking how they affect the cache. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des@des.no