From owner-p4-projects@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Aug 25 20:58:45 2008
Return-Path: GEOM has been present in FreeBSD since FreeBSD 5.0-RELEASE, with
increasing numbers of transform modules over time, including the
- GELI encryption and integrity protection module..
GEOM and GBDE were implemented by Poul-Henning Kamp.
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/www/mac.page#5 (text+ko) ==== @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@- Perforce: - //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/... -
-- Collection: - p4-cvs-trustedbsd-mac -
-Mandatory access controls extend discretionary access - controls by allowing administrators to enforce additional - security for all subjects (e.g. processes or sockets) and - objects (e.g. sockets, file system objects, sysctl nodes) in - the system. Development of those new access control models - is facilitated by the development of a flexible kernel - access control extension framework, the TrustedBSD MAC - Framework. This permits new access control models to be - introduced as kernel modules.
+Mandatory access controls extend operating system access control + policy by allowing administrators to enforce additional constraints + on user and application behavior. + The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is a kernel programming interface + allowing loadable modules to augment the system security policy in + order to implement mandatory access control in a flexible manner.
-Currently, modules exist that implement MLS (Multi-Level - Security), a fixed-label Biba integrity policy, Type - Enforcement, and several other security policies that - reflect common requirements of typical FreeBSD deployment - environments, such as mandatory limits on inter-user - visibility in multi-user environments. The current - implementation of Low-Watermark MAC (LOMAC) will also be - ported to use the module framework. In addition, the - DARPA-funded Network Associates Laboratories' CBOSS Project - is porting the NSA FLASK/SELinux implementation (SEBSD) to - run as an extension model over the TrustedBSD MAC Framework. - More information on the SEBSD module may be found on the - SEBSD page.
+The TrustedBSD MAC Framework first shipped in FreeBSD 5.0, with + significant functionality, quality, and performance enhancements in + later releases. Supported policy modules include rule-based file + system firewall support, TCP/UDP port access control lists, + inter-user process visibility controls, as well as classic mandatory + access control policies such as Multi-Level Security (MLS) with + compartments, and fixed- and floating-label Biba integrity policies. + Third party policy modules include cryptographic checksums on system + binaries, and SEBSD, a port of the NSA + FLASK/SELinux policy to FreeBSD. A number of commercial + FreeBSD-based products make use of the TrustedBSD MAC Framework to + locally modify the operating system security policy.
-This work is primarily occuring in a TrustedBSD Perforce - branch, but much of the framework has been merged to the - main FreeBSD development tree and was included in FreeBSD - 5.0 and forwards. The current implementation is appropriate - for experimental or limited production use; both internal - and exposed MAC APIs will not be frozen until 5.2-RELEASE. - All policy modules with the exception of the SEBSD - implementation have been merged into the FreeBSD tree at - this point.
- -Work has also recently begun on an experimental port of - the TrustedBSD MAC Framework from FreeBSD to Apple's - Darwin operating system. - Information on this port may be found on the SEDarwin page.
+The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is also present in Mac + OS X as of the Leopard release, where it is used to implement + Seatbelt and other system security services. A port of FLASK and + SELinux is also available via SEDarwin.
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/www/privileges.page#5 (text+ko) ==== @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@NB: Historically this project was referred to as fine-grained +
Historically this project was referred to as fine-grained capabilities, but due to a vocabulary conflict, it has been renamed to fine-grained privileges. Information in this page currently refers to a FreeBSD 5.x-era project to support fine-grained privileges, and - will shortly be superseded by a similar project for FreeBSD 8.x.
+ will shortly be superseded by a similar project for FreeBSD + 8.x.POSIX.1e breaks root privilege into a set of privileges
(historically referred to as "Capabilities"), which allow the
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/www/sebsd.page#9 (text+ko) ====
@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@
SUCH DAMAGE.
-->
-
- Perforce:
- //depot/projects/trustedbsd/sedarwin7/...
-
- Collection:
- p4-cvs-trustedbsd-sedarwin
- SEDarwin is a port of the TrustedBSD MAC
- Framework access control extension framework to Apple's
- Darwin operating system platform, along with a port of the
- SEBSD policy module.
- SEDarwin is highly experimental, but is currently sufficiently
- functional to allow the enforcement of mandatory process
- and file protections under Mac OS 10.3.8 and Darwin 7.3 on
- a variety of Apple PowerPC hardware.
+ The SEDarwin Project consisted of two parts: a port of the
+ TrustedBSD MAC Framework to the Mac OS X
+ operating system, and a similar adaptation of SEBSD to MAC OS X based on that port. This
+ port was made available against Mac OS X Panther and Mac OS X Tiger;
+ as of Mac OS X Leopard, the TrustedBSD MAC Framework is now
+ available as part of the shipping Mac OS X product. The SEDarwin project has recently moved to it's own website at
www.sedarwin.org. More
- information and current versions of SEDarwin can be found there.
- The Darwin Security Extension Project (DSEP) complements the
- SEDarwin work, but has a different goal. DSEP is primarily concerned
- with updating and maintaining the TrustedBSD MAC Framework on
- Darwin. While still experimental, the MAC Framework has been
- updated to support Mac OS X "Tiger", currently supporting Mac OS X
- 10.4.3 (Darwin 8.4). Note that the DSEP releases typically won't
- have the newest FLASK and SELinux components; they will be migrated
- to the Tiger platform soon. The DSEP sources have also recently moved to
- sedarwin.org