From owner-svn-ports-head@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Aug 7 16:11:19 2013 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14586A6; Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:11:19 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from mandree@FreeBSD.org) Received: from svn.freebsd.org (svn.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:2068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0120B2604; Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:11:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from svn.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.70]) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id r77GBI4C084153; Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:11:18 GMT (envelope-from mandree@svn.freebsd.org) Received: (from mandree@localhost) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.7/8.14.5/Submit) id r77GBIbh084150; Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:11:18 GMT (envelope-from mandree@svn.freebsd.org) Message-Id: <201308071611.r77GBIbh084150@svn.freebsd.org> From: Matthias Andree Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:11:18 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r324357 - in head/security: putty putty/files vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree for head List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2013 16:11:19 -0000 Author: mandree Date: Wed Aug 7 16:11:17 2013 New Revision: 324357 URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/324357 Log: Upgrade PuTTY to new 0.63 beta upstream release, adding vulnerability info. Quoting the upstream's change log: - Security fix: prevent a nefarious SSH server or network attacker from crashing PuTTY at startup in three different ways by presenting a maliciously constructed public key and signature. - Security fix: PuTTY no longer retains the private half of users' keys in memory by mistake after authenticating with them. - Revamped the internal configuration storage system to remove all fixed arbitrary limits on string lengths. In particular, there should now no longer be an unreasonably small limit on the number of port forwardings PuTTY can store. - Port-forwarded TCP connections which close one direction before the other should now be reliably supported, with EOF propagated independently in the two directions. This also fixes some instances of port-forwarding data corruption (if the corruption consisted of losing data from the very end of the connection) and some instances of PuTTY failing to close when the session is over (because it wrongly thought a forwarding channel was still active when it was not). - The terminal emulation now supports xterm's bracketed paste mode (allowing aware applications to tell the difference between typed and pasted text, so that e.g. editors need not apply inappropriate auto-indent). - You can now choose to display bold text by both brightening the foreground colour and changing the font, not just one or the other. - PuTTYgen will now never generate a 2047-bit key when asked for 2048 (or more generally n−1 bits when asked for n). - Some updates to default settings: PuTTYgen now generates 2048-bit keys by default (rather than 1024), and PuTTY defaults to UTF-8 encoding and 2000 lines of scrollback (rather than ISO 8859-1 and 200). - Unix: PSCP and PSFTP now preserve the Unix file permissions, on copies in both directions. - Unix: dead keys and compose-character sequences are now supported. - Unix: PuTTY and pterm now permit font fallback (where glyphs not present in your selected font are automatically filled in from other fonts on the system) even if you are using a server-side X11 font rather than a Pango client-side one. - Bug fixes too numerous to list, mostly resulting from running the code through Coverity Scan which spotted an assortment of memory and resource leaks, logic errors, and crashes in various circumstances. Security: 4b448a96-ff73-11e2-b28d-080027ef73ec Security: CVE-2013-4206 Security: CVE-2013-4207 Security: CVE-2013-4208 Security: CVE-2013-4852 Deleted: head/security/putty/files/patch-timing.c Modified: head/security/putty/Makefile head/security/putty/distinfo (contents, props changed) head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/putty/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/security/putty/Makefile Wed Aug 7 16:06:21 2013 (r324356) +++ head/security/putty/Makefile Wed Aug 7 16:11:17 2013 (r324357) @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # $FreeBSD$ PORTNAME= putty -PORTVERSION= 0.62 -PORTREVISION= 3 +PORTVERSION= 0.63 CATEGORIES= security ipv6 MASTER_SITES= http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/%SUBDIR%/ \ ftp://ftp.chiark.greenend.org.uk/users/sgtatham/putty-latest/ Modified: head/security/putty/distinfo ============================================================================== --- head/security/putty/distinfo Wed Aug 7 16:06:21 2013 (r324356) +++ head/security/putty/distinfo Wed Aug 7 16:11:17 2013 (r324357) @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -SHA256 (putty-0.62.tar.gz) = 8d187e86ee18c839895d263607b61788778564e3720e8d85c5305a04f9da0573 -SIZE (putty-0.62.tar.gz) = 1783106 +SHA256 (putty-0.63.tar.gz) = 81e8eaaf31be7d9a46b4f3fb80d1d9540776f142cd89d0a11f2f8082dc68f8b5 +SIZE (putty-0.63.tar.gz) = 1887913 Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Aug 7 16:06:21 2013 (r324356) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Wed Aug 7 16:11:17 2013 (r324357) @@ -51,6 +51,48 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beg --> + + PuTTY -- Four security holes in versions before 0.63 + + + putty + 0.63 + + + + +

Simon Tatham reports:

+
+

This [0.63] release fixes multiple security holes in previous versions of + PuTTY, which can allow an SSH-2 server to make PuTTY overrun or + underrun buffers and crash. [...] +

+ These vulnerabilities can be triggered before host key verification, + which means that you are not even safe if you trust the server you + think you're connecting to, since it could be spoofed over the + network and the host key check would not detect this before the attack + could take place. +

+ Additionally, when PuTTY authenticated with a user's private key, the + private key or information equivalent to it was accidentally kept in + PuTTY's memory for the rest of its run, where it could be retrieved by + other processes reading PuTTY's memory, or written out to swap files + or crash dumps. This release fixes that as well.

+
+ + + + CVE-2013-4206 + CVE-2013-4207 + CVE-2013-4208 + CVE-2013-4852 + + + 2013-07-08 + 2013-08-07 + + + typo3 -- Multiple vulnerabilities in TYPO3 Core