From owner-cvs-all Tue Aug 21 21:53:22 2001 Delivered-To: cvs-all@freebsd.org Received: from robin.mail.pas.earthlink.net (robin.mail.pas.earthlink.net [207.217.120.65]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85C8E37B403; Tue, 21 Aug 2001 21:52:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from cjc@earthlink.net) Received: from blossom.cjclark.org (dialup-209.245.130.30.Dial1.SanJose1.Level3.net [209.245.130.30]) by robin.mail.pas.earthlink.net (EL-8_9_3_3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA25317; Tue, 21 Aug 2001 21:52:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from cjc@localhost) by blossom.cjclark.org (8.11.4/8.11.3) id f7M4qk775771; Tue, 21 Aug 2001 21:52:46 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from cjc) Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2001 21:52:45 -0700 From: "Crist J. Clark" To: Kris Kennaway Cc: Mike Silbersack , cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/netinet tcp_input.c tcp_seq.h tcp_subr.c tcp_timer.c tcp_usrreq.c tcp_var.h Message-ID: <20010821215244.G313@blossom.cjclark.org> Reply-To: cjclark@alum.mit.edu References: <200108220058.f7M0wGf97070@freefall.freebsd.org> <20010821195920.A23850@xor.obsecurity.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <20010821195920.A23850@xor.obsecurity.org>; from kris@obsecurity.org on Tue, Aug 21, 2001 at 07:59:20PM -0700 Sender: owner-cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG On Tue, Aug 21, 2001 at 07:59:20PM -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote: > On Tue, Aug 21, 2001 at 05:58:16PM -0700, Mike Silbersack wrote: > > silby 2001/08/21 17:58:16 PDT > > > > Modified files: > > sys/netinet tcp_input.c tcp_seq.h tcp_subr.c > > tcp_timer.c tcp_usrreq.c tcp_var.h > > Log: > > Much delayed but now present: RFC 1948 style sequence numbers > > Yay! > > > In order to ensure security and functionality, RFC 1948 style > > initial sequence number generation has been implemented. Barring > > any major crypographic breakthroughs, this algorithm should be > > unbreakable. > > Except by brute force. A 32-bit sequence number just isn't naturally > very resistent to guessing, and on a fast connection, under favourable > circumstances, an attacker could simply cycle through them all. Actually, I believe the reason "total randomness" does not help all that much is more due to the fact a birthday attack on a 32-bit sequence number is not as difficult as it would seem. -- Crist J. Clark cjclark@alum.mit.edu To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message