Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 21:33:41 +0100 From: David Malone <dwmalone@maths.tcd.ie> To: Dan Nelson <dnelson@allantgroup.com> Cc: "Kurt J. Lidl" <lidl@pix.net>, Michael Smith <msmith@FreeBSD.ORG>, Doug White <dwhite@resnet.uoregon.edu>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Pawe=B3?= Jakub Dawidek <nick@garage.freebsd.pl>, freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Hardlinks... Message-ID: <20020408203341.GA61839@walton.maths.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <20020408194915.GA1749@dan.emsphone.com> References: <20020408113423.Y81506-100000@resnet.uoregon.edu> <200204081841.g38Ifi104580@mass.dis.org> <20020408144516.B2035@pix.net> <20020408194915.GA1749@dan.emsphone.com>
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On Mon, Apr 08, 2002 at 02:49:15PM -0500, Dan Nelson wrote: > .. or even if isn't, as someone might link it just before you delete > it. An attacker can still exhaust your inode quota with 0-length > files. > > I wonder if there is any reason to allow arbitrary hardlinking; maybe > only allow linking of files you currently have read access to? Only > files that you own? Only allow root to hardlink? How paranoid do you > want to be? :) It could always be another sysctl knob. I once wrote a patch to stop people making hardlinks to a file unless they were root or the file's owner. I ran with it for a bit and never noticed it being triggered. It probably should be a filesystem mount option, but we're out of them until the new mount code comes into use. David. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message
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