Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:07:55 -0400 (EDT) From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> To: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Speed and security of /dev/urandom Message-ID: <alpine.GSO.1.10.1407191707010.21571@multics.mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <20140719210534.GA4630@dft-labs.eu> References: <53C85F42.1000704@pyro.eu.org> <20140719190348.GM45513@funkthat.com> <20140719192605.GV93733@kib.kiev.ua> <53CAD950.1010609@pyro.eu.org> <20140719205350.GX93733@kib.kiev.ua> <20140719210534.GA4630@dft-labs.eu>
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On Sat, 19 Jul 2014, Mateusz Guzik wrote: > I believe the idea here is to have reliable source for reseeding after > fork. I don't think that's quite right; there are issues in reliably detecting that fork has occurred and a reseed performed. Always getting random bits from the kernel avoids the need to detect fork. -Ben
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