Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2001 01:49:24 -0800 (PST) From: opentrax@email.com To: ftobin@uiuc.edu Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: (no subject) Message-ID: <200101140949.BAA00822@spammie.svbug.com> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.31.0101140146280.41470-100000@palanthas.neverending.org>
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On 14 Jan, Frank Tobin wrote: > Crist J. Clark, at 16:50 -0800 on Sat, 13 Jan 2001, wrote: > > I am not sure I understand your argument here. I your system, how does > the _user_ authenticate himself? Biometrics? HW token? Smart card? > Really, no passwords? > >...[Trimmed].... > > One key idea is to leave the strength of the security as much up to the > user as possible. With passwords, however, the user has to worry about > both ends being compromoised (his end, and the server's end); if the > server is compromised, and his password gotten, this might be used against > him other places. With public-key authentication, he only has to worry > about his end; if the server's end is compromised, the user's security is > compromised little. > The concept you present "leave the strength.. up to the user.." is sound. As a matter of fact, one security concept worth noting is, "the person damaged - should be the person responsible". However, your argument for PKA shows a flaw in assuming that the PKA offer some type of protection if the server is comprimised. If the server is comprimised, then *any* schenario must make certain assumptions. Hence, the-man-in-the-middle schenarios/attacks. I should also state that arguments on this level are nothing more than vicious circles. Even a deep analysis will lead back to other weakness. That is, weaknesses not associated with PKA, SSH or the client/server. Best Regards, Jessem. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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