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Date:      Wed, 8 Aug 2001 13:15:31 +0800
From:      "David Xu" <bsddiy@163.net>
To:        "Christopher Ellwood" <chris+freebsd-net@silicon.net>, <freebsd-net@freebsd.org>
Subject:   Re: Problem with Code Red II and HTTP Accept Filtering
Message-ID:  <004401c11fc9$25a08950$6201a8c0@William>
References:  <20010807213844.N672-100000@diamond>

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my opinion is don't use accept filter, it can become DOS attack target.
sending a big http header and don't complete it,  it does not let apache know a connection 
is already made and there is no timeout counter like which in Apache server.
using an accept filter can not get so much benifit.

--
David Xu

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Christopher Ellwood" <chris+freebsd-net@silicon.net>
To: <freebsd-net@freebsd.org>
Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2001 12:42 PM
Subject: Problem with Code Red II and HTTP Accept Filtering


> The Code Red II worm seems to have a negative impact on FreeBSD machines
> with HTTP Accept Filtering enabled either statically in the kernel or via
> modules.
> 
> The man page for accf_http states that:
> 
>      It prevents the application from receiving the connected descriptor via
>      accept() until either a full HTTP/1.0 or HTTP/1.1 HEAD or GET request has
>      been buffered by the kernel.
> 
> What seems to be happening is Code Red II sends its 3.8K malformed
> request, but the accept filter doesn't recognize this request as being
> completed.  So the connection sits in the established state with 3818
> bytes in the Receive Queue as shown in the following netstat:
> 
> Proto Recv-Q Send-Q  Local Address          Foreign Address        (state)
> tcp4    3818      0  10.1.1.1.80            64.1.1.1.2932       ESTABLISHED
> 
> If you get enough of these (about 20-30 on a machine with NMBCLUSTERS set
> to 1024), your mbuf cluster pool becomes exhausted and network
> transactions begin to fail.
> 
> This inadvertent side affect of the Code Red worm suggests that it would
> also be relatively easy to launch a denial of service attack against a
> machine with HTTP accept filtering.
> 
> This was observed on FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE machine running both Apache
> 1.3.19 and 1.3.20.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> - Christopher Ellwood
> Network Security Consultant
> 
> 
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